

# THE PACIFIC WAR



# **GLOSSARY of ABBREVIATIONS**

- CINCLANTFLT:** Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (or his staff)
- CINCPACTFLT:** Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (or his staff)
- CINCUS:** Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces (or his staff.  
Pronounced Sink Us.)
- ComInCh:** What used to be called CINCUS (sink us).
- CNO:** Chief of Naval Operations
- POA:** Pacific Ocean Area – anywhere in the Pacific not under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
- CINCPOA:** Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (ADM Nimitz)
- SWPA:** Southwest Pacific Area – where General MacArthur is in charge.
- SCSWPA:** Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area – because MacArthur cannot be seen as equal to a mere CINC.
- SOPA:** South Pacific Area – the Pacific east of General MacArthur and south of the equator.
- TF:** Task Force – a naval force as defined by the naval area commander.
- TG:** A subset of a Task Force designated for a specific mission.

# GLOSSARY of ABBREVIATIONS

## NAVY

**FAMD – Fleet Admiral**

**ADM – Admiral**

or generically any admiral

**VADM – Vice Admiral**

**RADM – Rear Admiral**

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**CAPT – Captain**

**CDR – Commander**

Also used for LCDR

**LCDR – Lieutenant Commander**

**LT – Lieutenant**

**LTJG – Lieutenant Jr. Grade**

Also called “Lieutenant”

**ENS – Ensign**

## ARMY/AIR CORPS

**AGEN – General of the Army**

**GEN – General**

or generically any general

**LGEN – Lieutenant General**

**MGEN – Major General**

**BGEN – Brigadier General**

**COL - Colonel**

Also used for LTC

**LTC – Lieutenant Colonel**

**MAJ – Major**


**CPT – Captain**

**1LT – First Lieutenant**

**2LT – Second Lieutenant**


In the Navy, any officer in command of a vessel is called “Captain” (CO) regardless of rank. Officers LCDR and below are addressed as “Mister” or by their rank. In the Navy, the second in command, or Executive Officer is referred to as the “XO”.

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



The final acts played out June 6<sup>th</sup>. During the night Yamamoto changed his mind and ordered a general withdrawal. Then, two of his heavy cruiser collided. Mogami was crippled. The other ship, Mikuma, and two destroyer were ordered to escort it back to port and to stand by to tow if necessary...

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



**The cripples were found by the morning patrol from Midway. The remaining Marine dive bombers from Midway, along with those from Hornet and another strike from Enterprise attacked. The two cruisers were ruined.**


# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



**Mikuma, above, would sink following crippling explosions of her own torpedoes (Mogami had dumped hers over the side the night before to avoid just such a fate). Mogami would survive, but need over a year of repairs.**

**Spruance, noting the enemy was withdrawing to the west and into Japanese air cover from Wake decided to call the battle over and turned east for Hawaii.**

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



**In the afternoon of June 6<sup>th</sup> as both sides were retiring, the Japanese submarine I-68 came upon the Yorktown. It fired six torpedoes. One struck the destroyer Hammond, sinking it in five minutes. Two hit Yorktown. The damage was beyond salvage and Yorktown was abandoned for good.**

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY





# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



**Yorktown finally sank just after dawn, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1942.**

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY



Japanese prisoners of war – survivors of the Hiryu – arrive at Midway, June 1942.

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY

## Carrier Strike Force

4 CV  
73 fighters  
72 dive bombers  
81 torpedo bombers  
2 BB  
2 CA  
1 CL  
12 DD  
5 AO

## Main Body

3 BB  
1 CVE  
8 torpedo bombers  
2 Seaplane tenders  
1 CL  
9 DD  
2 AO

16 Submarines

## Invasion Support

2 BB  
4 CA  
1 CL  
8 DD  
1 CVL  
12 fighters  
12 torpedo bombers  
4 AO

## Occupation Force

1 CL  
11 DD  
2 seaplane tenders  
12 transports

1 AO

## Bombardment Force

4 CA  
2 DD  
1 AO

## Aleutian Strike Force

1 CV, 1 CVL  
40 fighters  
15 dive bombers  
21 torpedo bomber  
3 CA  
5 DD  
3 AO

## Aleutian Support Force

4 BB  
2 CL  
12 DD  
2 AO

## Attu/Kiska Landings

3 CL  
8 DD  
1 seaplane Tender  
3 Transports

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY

## TF-17 (Yorktown)

- 1 CV
- 25 fighters
- 37 dive bombers
- 15 torpedo bombers

2 CA

6 DD

## TF-16 (Enterprise/Hornet)

- 2 CV
- 54 fighters
- 72 dive bombers
- 29 torpedo bombers

6 CA

9 DD

4 AO

19 Submarines

## AT MIDWAY

21 F2A Brewster Buffalo (fighter)

7 F4F fighters

17 SB2U dive bombers

27 Dauntless dive bombers

6 TBF Avenger torpedo bombers

31 PBY seaplanes

17 B-17 heavy bombers

4 B-26 medium bombers

# THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY LOSSES

## JAPANESE

4 CV Sunk (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu)

1 CA Sunk (Mikuma)

1 CA heavily damaged (Mogami)

1 BB, 1 DD, 1 AO damaged

248 aircraft lost

3,057 KIA

37 POW

## U.S.

1 CV Sunk (Yorktown)

1 DD Sunk (Hammond)

150 aircraft lost

307 KIA

# **THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH**

**Marc Mitcher: CO Hornet. His after action report was so inaccurate RADM Spruance told Nimitz and King to disregard it entirely. He had already selected for admiral and upon return to Hawaii was transferred to Alaska. He would later command land based aviation in the South Pacific before returning to sea in 1943.**

**Stanhope Ring: Hornet Air Group Commander. Transferred to shore duty upon return to Hawaii.**

**Halsey's (Spruance's) Chief of Staff who messed up the launch of TF-16 would get command of a carrier and lose it in a couple of months after running aground.**

**Dick Best: Bombing 6 CO. Credited with the only bomb hit on Akagi. Leading the attack on Hiryu, further credited with one of the four hits scored on that carrier. Both Japanese carriers were sunk.**

**A day later he was coughing up blood. They later discovered he had an undiagnosed, inactive case of tuberculosis that had been triggered by his defective oxygen system. He was medically retired within a year.**

**He passed away in 2001.**

**WAR IS CHAOS. THAT IS WHY  
THE AMERICANS ARE SO GOOD  
AT IT. THE AMERICANS ARE IN  
A PERPETUAL STATE OF CHAOS.**

**Attributed to an officer of the German General Staff in WWII.**

**IT IS WELL AND GOOD THAT  
WE STUDY AMERICAN MILITARY  
DOCTRINE PROVIDED WE REMEMBER  
IT SHALL BE THE FIRST THING THEY  
ABANDON ONCE WAR STARTS.**

**Attributed to instruction from the Red Army War College at Frunze.**



# NAVY HAD WORD OF JAP PLAN TO STRIKE AT SEA

## Knew Dutch Harbor Was a Feint.

Washington, D. C., June 7.—The strength of the Japanese forces with which the American navy is battling somewhere west of Midway Island in what is believed to be the greatest naval battle of the war, was well known in American naval circles several days before the battle began, reliable sources in the naval intelligence disclosed here tonight.

The navy learned of the gathering of the powerful Japanese units soon after they put forth from their bases, it was said. Altho their purpose was not specifically known, the information in the hands of the navy department was so definite that a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade and occupy another base, was predicted. Guesses were even made that Dutch Harbor and Midway Island might be targets.

The advance information enabled the American navy to make full use of air attacks on the approaching Japanese ships, turning the struggle into an air battle along the modern lines of naval warfare so often predicted in Tribune editorials.

It was known that the Japanese fleet—the most powerful yet used in this war—was broken into three sections: First, a striking force; next a support force, and finally an occupation fleet.

**THE STRIKING FORCE:** Four aircraft carriers, the Akaga and Kaga of 25,900 tons each, and the Hiryo and Soryu of 10,000 tons each; 2 battleships of the Kirishima class—29,300 tons with 14 inch guns; 2 cruisers of the Tone class—new 8,500 ton 6.1 inch gun ships; 12 destroyers.

# OOOPS!!

On June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1942, the Chicago Tribune published an article about a huge, ongoing naval battle near Midway Island. It stated that the Navy knew of the Japanese plans well in advance.

None of this had been released by the Navy.

The reporter, Stanley Johnson (above left with his attorney) had been aboard Lexington at Coral Sea and had returned to the U.S. aboard a destroyer with CDR Morton Seligman (below), XO of the Lexington who, apparently, showed his new friend the latest CINCPAC Intelligence summaries.

Johnson arrived in the U.S. June 2<sup>nd</sup>.



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# OOOPS!!

The article neither stated how the Navy knew about the Japanese plans, nor speculated.

Fortunately, the Japanese (outside the U.S.) did not read the Chicago Tribune and those Japanese officials still in the states (including Normura, Kurusu and the naval intelligence officers who had been in Hawaii) who had been interred in Virginia, were on a train to New York on June 7<sup>th</sup> to be sent back to Japan and had not been given their daily, complimentary copies of the papers as they had been throughout their internment.

But the Japanese had just changed their codes...

It was an obvious security breach...



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# OOOPS!!

CDR Seligman had been selected for promotion to Captain and was about to receive his second Navy Cross (the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest medal for valor) for his actions at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

He got his medal.

He did not get his promotion.

He was hidden away at a desk until he was forced to retire on active duty in 1944. (Fired)

He went on to work in Hollywood as a technical consultant in war movies.

(Whether the message was intentionally shown to the reporter or negligently left lying around the stateroom he shared with the reporter was never determined.)



# OOOPS!!

Stanley Johnson and the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Robert McCormick (above) were charged by the Justice Department for violations of the Espionage Act.

(Julius and Ethel Rosenberg would be charged under the same Act in 1951 for allegedly giving atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets. They were executed in 1953.)

Robert McCormick was a leading isolationist before the war. He was opposed to the war in general and Roosevelt in particular. Perhaps worse for him, he was a personal and professional ... adversary ... of the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (below), former publisher of the Chicago Daily News.

(Knox was also anti-isolationist. They were un-American, in his opinion.)

The charges were dropped during the grand jury hearings when it became clear that to obtain a conviction, the government would have to publically disclose they had broken the Japanese codes.



**WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY  
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION**

Presidio of San Francisco, California

May 3, 1942

**INSTRUCTIONS  
TO ALL PERSONS OF  
JAPANESE  
ANCESTRY**

**Living in the Following Area:**

All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within the boundary beginning at the point where the southerly limits of the City of Oakland meet San Francisco Bay; thence easterly and following the southerly limits of said city to U. S. Highway No. 58; thence southerly and easterly on said Highway No. 59 to its intersection with California State Highway No. 21; thence southerly on said Highway No. 21 to its intersection, at or near Warm Springs, with California State Highway No. 17; thence southerly on said Highway No. 17 to the Alameda-Santa Clara County line; thence westerly and following said county line to San Francisco Bay; thence southerly, and following the shoreline of San Francisco Bay to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, this Headquarters, dated May 3, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Saturday, May 9, 1942.

No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Sunday, May 3, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Northern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at:

920 - "C" Street,  
Hayward, California.

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

**The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:**

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday, May 4, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, May 5, 1942.
2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:
  - (a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
  - (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
  - (c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
  - (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
  - (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.
4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.
5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage, at the sole risk of the owner, of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.
6. Each family, and individual living alone, will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

**Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Monday, May 4, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, May 5, 1942, to receive further instructions.**

J. I. DeWITT  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...

Under the accepted rules of warfare in 1941, when one country went to war with another it had the right to confine involuntarily any and all "enemy aliens" within their borders until such time as they could be exchanged for their own citizens so interred.

If an exchange could not be arranged, they could hold the enemy aliens for the duration.

An enemy alien was a person who was a citizen of the hostile power.

Today it would be someone in the United States on a Work Visa, a Student Visa, a Tourist Visa, a Diplomatic Passport or similar; in other words, those who enter the U.S. with the intent to return to their country at some time.

It would not include immigrants, naturalized citizens or native-born citizens of foreign ancestry.

# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...

In the U.S. In 1940 there were approximately:

<b>1<sup>st</sup> Generation</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Generation</b>	<b>Enemy Aliens (Not immigrant)</b>
<b>1,237,000 German</b>	<b>~4,000,000</b>	<b>300,000</b>
<b>1,623,850 Italian</b>	<b>~5,000,000</b>	<b>695,000</b>
<b>105,000 Japanese</b>	<b>~260,000</b>	<b>6,000</b>

**Executive Orders 2525-2527 of 7 Dec 1941**

	<b>Interred Enemy Alien</b>
<b>German</b>	<b>11,507</b>
<b>Italian</b>	<b>1,955</b>
<b>Japanese</b>	<b>7,000</b>

**Enemy Alien were those who where born in a foreign country whether or not they were U.S. citizens. Those interred were ones who were deemed threats based upon their affiliation with an enemy nation following an FBI investigation.**



# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



In 1940, the President requested the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) to advise him of the potential “fifth column” threat posed by foreign born immigrant residents of Germany, Italy and Japan.

Germans were considered the most likely to be a threat to the U.S. (thanks to the German Bund).

Japanese immigrants might prove more fanatic if they were so inclined but they were reported as being politically opposed to the policies of their birth country and least likely to pose a national security threat. (Over 98% deemed as loyal to the U.S. without question.)

After December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1941 the people of the West Coast (mostly California) felt otherwise ... very strongly and loudly...



# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



Earl Warren was Attorney General for California and running for Governor in 1942. He was also a member of an anti-Asian society Native Sons of the Golden West. As Attorney General, he pushed a bill through the legislature allowing the State to confiscate Asian (Japanese) owned land.

(It was later ruled unconstitutional).



He also pressured Washington to give the States authority to deal with the Japanese residing within their borders.


“The Japanese situation as it exists today may well be the Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort.”

Roosevelt gave the local military commanders the authority.

Warren won his election with 90% of the vote.



# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



President Roosevelt signed Executive Order (EO) 9066 on Feb 19<sup>th</sup>, 1942. This allowed local military commanders the discretion to declare areas restricted access and define the scope of the restrictions.

The U.S. commander on the West Coast, LGEN Dewitt (4<sup>th</sup> Army), made Warren look color blind. Japanese were incapable of anything like loyalty – in his opinion.



Roosevelt signed an executive order on March 9<sup>th</sup>, 1942 mandating the relocation of all Japanese Americans residing in an exclusion zone designated by local (National Guard) military commanders.

On March 18<sup>th</sup>, he signed EO 9102 that established the War Relocation Authority responsible for relocation camps and transport of Japanese to such camps.

# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



Beginning in May 1942, some 110,000 Japanese, almost 2/3 U.S. Citizens (the other 1/3 had lived in the U.S. at least 20 years), were sent to the camps.

They had to sell or dispose of all property aside from clothes, bedding, toiletries, dishes and cutlery before their relocation. Even then, there was a weight limit.



# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



~110,000 Japanese lived in the (yellow) exclusion zones and were sent to camps. The ~160,000 who lived elsewhere (Hawaii and the rest of the U.S.) were not.

# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...



**A Platoon of the Hawaii Territorial Guard in 1941 (later part of the 442<sup>nd</sup> RCT, the most decorated unit in the War.) One of the best units in the National Guard, over half of its officers and troops were Japanese. More Japanese lived in Hawaii than on the entire West Coast – about 40% of the population (140,000). Less than 1,600 were detained, all by the FBI under separate authority and the vast majority were released within a week. There were no camps for the Japanese in Hawaii.**

# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...

On Dec 18<sup>th</sup>, 1944, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled on whether the detention of the Japanese was legal in the first instance.

The petitioner sought relief for his detention under the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment stating he was deprived of his liberty and property without due process of law and that his detention was based solely and unlawfully on his ethnicity and no other legitimate reason.

The court clearly had issues with race-based rules such as those imposed upon the Japanese Americans but, as the government claimed detention was a National Security issue, deferred to the government.

This was the infamous *Korematsu* case which would only be overruled recently in a case involving the detention of illegal aliens.

But it was not the only case decided that day.



# NOT OUR FINEST HOUR...

On Dec 18<sup>th</sup>, 1944, a unanimous U.S Supreme Court essentially found the detentions unconstitutional. In *Ex Parte Endo*, brought under a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court found that while the government might detain for suspected disloyalty, it must prove disloyalty in fact to continue detentions on a case by case basis.

Not a single Japanese American was ever charged with espionage or sabotage during the war.

The day before, Roosevelt vacated all orders detaining the Japanese.

Some were lucky. Friends had bought their property for next to nothing and sold it back for that or less.

Most were not so lucky. They had sold cheap and could not hope to buy back.



# FINDING A MISSION...



**What do the Brooklyn Bridge, the Louisiana Bayou and deadly hurricanes in Florida have to do with winning the War in the Pacific?**

# FINDING A MISSION...

In the Interwar years (1919 – 1940), the United State Marine Corps spent much time and political capital on existing.

The Marines are part of the Navy, funded through the Navy. Traditionally, they existed to maintain discipline on ships, repel enemy boarders and send small landing parties on hostile shores.

In the last two wars (Spanish American and World War I) it had fought as infantry, distinguishable from the Army only in having better looking uniforms.

In the 1920's and 30's, with lean budgets, the Navy was not inclined to fight too hard to fund the Marines and the Army argued the Marines were just fancy infantry ... redundant.

The Marines needed a Marine mission...





# FINDING A MISSION...



**Shipboard Marine detachments were a tradition but as a military capability they were also an anachronism.**

**But Marines did do stuff with boats.**

**Marines were “Soldiers of the Sea” capable of moving from ships to fight ashore where the Army needed ports to get off the ship.**

**Or so the Marines argued. It proved easier said than done because in the 1920’s and early 1930’s they used lifeboats which were not designed for landing troops.**

**In 1937, they (with the Navy) began looking for boats that could land on a beach, offload quickly and get back out to sea on its own...**

# FINDING A MISSION...



**Andrew Higgins of New Orleans began his career in lumber and boat building along the gulf coast before starting his own lumber company in 1922.**

**And then as it was cheaper to build them than buy them, he built boats and barges.**

**In 1926 he built the Eureka boat. It could be used to take crews into the swamps. He also sold them. Officially, his customers were oil companies and trappers.**

**His largest customer base were rumrunners.**

**The lumber company failed in the Great Depression. The boat company survived ... barely ... but it was struggling.**

**Then the Navy Department came ...**



# FINDING A MISSION...



**The Marines – and the Navy (who had to buy it) were very impressed with Higgins Eureka boat.**

**A stock version (above) out performed all of the competition as far as being able to get ashore quickly and off again.**



**That cabin thing had to go.**

**The result was Higgins LCP(L) (Landing Craft Personnel Light) which was adopted by the Navy and Marines in 1939.**

**It would see extensive use in the Pacific for landing troops. It was fast but not efficient and no better than ships boats at unloading vehicles or heavy cargo.**

# FINDING A MISSION...



The Marines in China had noted the Japanese landing craft. They were slower than Higgins boats, but they had something the LCP(L) did not: large retractable ramps at the bow.

They could discharge soldiers quickly and ... heavy guns, small vehicles and equipment. The Marines asked if Higgins could do something like that.



# FINDING A MISSION...



Higgins quickly came up with the LCP(R) (landing craft personnel – ramp) It was a slightly modified version of the LCP(L) with a small ramp at the bow that allowed men to exit without climbing over the sides.

But it was not ideal for large equipment.


So Higgins quickly modified the design again and gave it a wider ramp – wide enough to allow troops to exit more rapidly and to offload small vehicles and artillery. It was, however, slower.

The LCVP (landing craft vehicle personnel) would be by far the most common, built by the thousands.

But they were all essentially the same basic boat...



# FINDING A MISSION...



Since they were essentially the same boat, the navy could use the same equipment to handle them. This was something that sold the navy on the boats.

**Above: USS John Penn (APA-23) in the Pacific. All three types of Higgins boats are embarked. The APA – Assault Transport – was a modified cargo ship designed to operate landing craft. Over 200 saw service.**



**Bellow: USS Tatnall (APD-19). This was a High Speed Transport, a type exclusive to the Pacific. The Tatnall was a converted surplus WWI destroyer. Later ones were modified Destroyer Escorts. 130 saw service.**

**The Tatnall has both LCP(L) and (R).**


# FINDING A MISSION...

The Navy/Marine program to find better ways to get from the ship to shore was ... open minded. In 1938 they heard about Donald Roebing.

Roebing was the grandson of Washington Roebing and great-grandson of John Roebing who had built and designed the Brooklyn Bridge respectively.

The younger Roebing was ... a gentleman of leisure – having the wealth not to need a job. But he was a Roebing and always making something. Following the 1928 Hurricane he set out to build an all-purpose vehicle for rescue work.

His experiments were featured in a 1938 issue of Life Magazine...



# FINDING A MISSION...

... which just happened to be lying around at a cocktail party in San Diego attended by RADM Kalfus and MGEN Little – both of whom were aware of the Navy and Marine Corps program to develop the ability to land troops.

They thought it looked promising.

The Marines sent someone out to look at the contraption.

It took some convincing (Roebbling was about helping people, not making weapons), but the Marines got their odd vehicle.

It entered service in early 1942, before the Marine had done anything amphibious...





# FINDING A MISSION...



**Roebbling's odd vehicles would be in the Pacific War from the beginning of amphibious operations. They, along with Higgins' collection of boats, would land the Marines at Guadalcanal in August 1942 and every island thereafter.**

**(Above: LVT-1's landing at Guadalcanal on August 7<sup>th</sup>, 1942.)**

**The LVT series was the U.S. military's first armored personnel carrier ... in addition to being able to float.**

# FINDING A MISSION...

The original LVT's made for good transports as they could get over reefs to the beach and inland before troops had to get out.

Getting out, however, was awkward and exposed the troops to enemy fire as they had to clamber over the sides.

(Above: Marines debarking from an LVT at Guadalcanal in 1942).



Later versions, beginning with the LVT-3 series introduced in 1944 had a retractable and watertight ramp at the rear.

(Below: Marines leaving an LVT-3 at Okinawa in April 1945)



15,000 LVT troop carriers were built.

# FINDING A MISSION...

The Army was less interested in a personnel carrier but a floating tank was another thing altogether. They stuck a turret from the M-3 Stuart light tank and came up with the LVT(A)-1 (above).



The Marines bought them as well.

Later, they put a 75mm howitzer on another version and had the LVT(A)-4.

And the Marines bought them as well.

They were both effective fighting vehicles in the Pacific. Then again, the Japanese tanks were not all that good.



They were not used in Europe where the Germans had real tanks.

# FINDING A MISSION...

The sole British contribution to the new doctrine was an odd idea for a ship – one designed to run aground!

Entering the war in early 1943, it was the Tank Landing Ship or LST, although it landed just about everything else as well. The U.S. built over 1,000 and more than half went to the Pacific.

The ship could offload right onto a beach.

The effect was the land forces did not need a port at all which was a good thing because there were not many at all in the Pacific and the U.S. made sure the ones that were there were bombed into uselessness.



# WHERE DID LST'S COME FROM?



# WHERE DID LST'S COME FROM?



# WHERE DID LST'S COME FROM?

	Built	Atlantic	Pacific	Lend Lease	
Ambridge PA	123	A: 34	P: 100	UK: 2	
Baltimore MD	31	A: 0	P: 1	UK: 30	
Boston MA (N)	44	A: 18	P: 35	UK: 5	
Charleston SC	8	A: 6	P: 4	UK: 2	
Evansville IN	170	A: 36	P: 136	UK: 12	
Hingham MA	93	A: 6	P: 89		
Jefferson IN	122	A: 29	P: 99	UK: 10	
Neville Island PA	147	A: 29	P: 120	UK: 7	GR: 4
Newport News VA	18	A: 12	P: 8	UK: 3	
New York NY (N)	8	A: 8	P: 0	UK: 1	
Norfolk VA (N)	18	A: 12	P: 5	UK: 6	
Philadelphia PA (N)	15	A: 7	P: 3	UK: 8	
Quincy MA	46	A: 20	P: 28	UK: 13	
Richmond CA	14	A: 0	P: 14		
Seneca IL	158	A: 27	P: 129	UK: 7	
Vancouver WA	31	A: 0	P: 31		
Wilmington DE	3	A: 3	P: 2		
	1,049	247	805	112	

(N) – Naval Shipyard

# PRAIRIE SHIPYARDS

**Almost 70% of the over 1,000 LST's build during the war were built on the Ohio and Illinois Rivers. Only one of the companies had built boats of any kind before the war: Jefferson Boat and Machine. The others were known for iron work: Chicago Bridge & Iron, Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron and Dravo Corp.**

**Evansville at least had some history in building for the Navy – it had built some gunboats during the Civil War.**

**Chicago Bridge and Iron did not even have a place to build anything on that scale, much less a history in that field.**

**Evansville would lead all ship builders in LST construction.**





# PRAIRIE SHIPYARDS

**The second largest builder of LST's was Chicago Bridge & Iron at Seneca Illinois.**

**It's on the Illinois river about ten miles east of Ottawa and forty-five miles west of Joliet.**

**In 1940, Seneca had a population of about 1,300. It had no shipyard. By late 1942 it was building LST's for the Navy. By 1947, the shipyard and the housing for the 20,000+ workers was all gone but for the concrete slabs.**

**This was not an uncommon occurrence during the war. Most of the war work was temporary by its nature.**




# PRAIRIE SHIPYARDS

Most of the war plants had more jobs than workers. Labor was not in short supply nationally, but often locally once war production started to really pick up.

Most of the work force, therefore, was from elsewhere. Housing was in short supply and the government provided temporary solutions – not intended to survive the war.

Some companies such as Kaiser Shipbuilding provided far better housing – it was a selling point in the labor market.

But given that employees were making more than they had in years – even in their entire lives – bad housing was not an issue for them.



# PRAIRIE SHIPYARDS

At Seneca, few if any of the workers had ever built a ship before. This was the case for many who entered war production jobs.

Women would be employed throughout industry in any job as were blacks. Southern employers had to pay equal wages lest their labor pool move to where employers had fewer issues.



# PRAIRIE SHIPYARDS

There would be a recession after the war. Many workers (most all of the women and many more) were laid off when the government orders were cancelled.

Many GI's found few jobs waiting for them – but they had the GI Bill.

Seneca's shipyard closed. Others would follow and not all by the choice of their management. U.S. produced so many ships that it would be years – and changes in shipping itself – before new ones would be needed.

In 1950 Seneca' population was 1,500. Today it's around 2,300. Once a year it has a festival entitled "Shipyard Days."



# COMINCH



The senior officer in the Navy in June of 1942 both by position and by date of rank was Ernest King. He graduated 4<sup>th</sup> in his Naval Academy class in 1901.

He was brilliant and almost impossible to work for. No one really liked him.

He served in battleships for almost twenty years and, after not getting promoted as fast as he thought he should, he switched to submarines in 1923.

He never actually commanded A submarine, just a bunch of them.

He did design the dolphins worn by those qualified in subs ... he never was.

He then went to aviation...

# COMINCH



**He was 49 when he barely qualified as an Aviator in 1927 both younger and not as good a pilot as Bill Halsey would be.**

**Like Halsey, he would command Lexington and a Carrier Group.**

**In between, he served in Washington and as there was a vacancy for command of Lexington, he suggested the position to Bill Halsey ... who took it.**

**In 1938, he took command of all the carriers ... and attacked Pearl Harbor (on an exercise).**

**Much to his horror, in 1939 he was assigned to the Navy General Board which was sort of a retirement home for about to be retired admirals...**

# COMINCH

**Then again, he had a reputation.**

**Roosevelt said he shaved with a blowtorch.**

**His daughter said he was the most even tempered officer in the Navy: always in a rage.**

**He liked to sit next to pretty women at dinners ... and ... well these days you don't do that. And even back then it was bad form ... especially if she was another officer's wife.**

**He stayed out of his cabin at sea as often as possible lest people think he was drunk. (Which means he had a reputation for drinking at sea ... and that was against regulations and had been since 1916...)**



# COMINCH



**He had little regard for the Japanese who were barely noticeable. There were bigger enemies to hate:**

**The Press, (they were mindless busybodies who had no need to know anything except that the war was over and who won.)**

**The British, and**

**The U.S. Army.**

**And yet in August 1940 he was salvaged from the admiral scrap heap by then CNO Harold Stark to command the Atlantic Fleet which, should war break out, had to work with the British in a theater that would be dominated by the Army.**

**He would say: “When the going get’s tough, they call on the sons-of-bitches.”**



# COMINCH

Then Pearl Harbor happened.

He knew it had to be a Navy show (and fortunately, it was not his fleet that was sunk.) On December 30<sup>th</sup>, he was named CINCUS – the commander of all naval forces worldwide.

He changed the name to ComInch. “Sink Us” seemed rather inappropriate.

On March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1942 he became CNO as well, the only man to hold that post as well as operational command.

He immediately tried to run the show. Nimitz wouldn't have it and neither would the President so he backed off ... a little.

He was the reason Washington did not believe Hawaii about Midway at first...



# COMINCH



**By May 1942, the Pacific Fleet had seven battleships. By late June it had eight. Colorado had been in overhaul on the West Coast on December 7<sup>th</sup>. Pennsylvania, Maryland and Tennessee were repaired and four others joined from the Atlantic. King wanted Nimitz to use them.**

**Nimitz only had a use for the North Carolina (barely). It was commissioned in 1940 and fast enough to keep up with the carriers (the others were not even close). But all of them were fuel hogs and oilers were few.**

# COMINCH

However, King was not all wrong.

King had been with Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference in Aug 1941 and knew that the U.S. had agreed to a Europe First strategy.



But he did not believe such a strategy was truly necessary. Moreover, it assumed Japan could be contained and it had not been and was not.

Yet unless the Navy could initiate and sustain an offensive in the Pacific, resources would be allocated to Europe at the expense of the Pacific.

And he knew that MacArthur was not ready and the Japanese were likely to make a move towards Port Moresby.

He felt the Navy had to do something. It had to seize the initiative and with the victory at Midway it only made more sense.

# COMINCH

Europe First might be what the President wanted, but not King or the Navy. They were now building what would become the largest navy ever but the idea of holding in the Pacific until Germany was defeated meant that Navy would spend the next few years mostly unemployed.

The revised plans for war with Japan envisioned an aggressive war of attrition, one which U.S. production would prevail. The war to date had been one of maneuver.


What the Navy needed to do, in the words of historian Jon Parshall was “get the Japanese in a headlock and pound the snot out of them.”

Specifically, find some place in the Pacific that Japan could not ignore and force Japan to throw everything at it.

That place was an unremarkable island in the South Pacific...



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER




King told Nimitz to plan for an offensive into the Solomon Islands.

Tulagi, which Japan had made into a seaplane base in May was to be a target as was neighboring Florida Island and the Santa Cruz Islands to the east.

Guadalcanal was unoccupied, had no harbor and was not considered a target.

But to even hit Tulagi, things had to be changed as the Solomons was under MacArthur's command area. Fortunately MacArthur did not think such a plan was practical or relevant. Washington did so the lines were changed.



Pacific Ocean Area (POA) included Central, South, Southeast and Northern Pacific Areas.

NORTH PACIFIC AREA  
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA


POA NIMITZ  
JAPANESE OUTER PERIMETER 2 JULY 1942  
POA and SWPA under UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DIRECTION

POA and SWPA under UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DIRECTION


CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA  
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

**THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC, 1941**  
STATUS OF FORCES AND THEATER BOUNDARIES  
2 July 1942  
SCALE OF MILES

# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



In mid-July, as the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was already heading south from California, reconnaissance flights from Australia discovered the Japanese were on Guadalcanal building an airfield.




The target now included taking the airfield from the Japanese.

The Marines made a practice landing at Fiji on July 26<sup>th</sup>. It was cancelled when it turned out their charts were inaccurate and their tide information even worse.


They also learned not to trust the longshoremen to load ships without supervision...

# OPERATION WATCHTOWER





# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



Cargo ships were normally loaded to maximize space utilization and stability. The heavy stuff went on the bottom, lighter stuff on top.


Combat Loading means the ship is loaded so that the stuff needed first is on top and the stuff needed later is on the bottom. The Navy and Marines knew this.

The civilian port workers back in the States did not and no one thought they needed to be told to do it differently.

After Fiji, the ships headed to New Zealand to try and fix the loading.

But the New Zealand stevedores proved difficult (threatening a strike) and there was not time in any case.

The Marines had to leave their heavy artillery behind.



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER


Nimitz wanted Halsey in command but Halsey was sick. He would have had VADM Pye as the alternative but ADM King would not. Roosevelt suggested VADM Ghormley who he knew well and Ghormley was sent south ... on little notice.

The command structure would never be used again. Ghormley was a theater commander ... and in command of the operation. His carriers were under VADM Frank Jack Fletcher who was cautious, well aware he had no spares.


The Amphibious Forces was commanded by Richmond K. Turner who was not overly cautious and the Landing Force by MGEN Alexander Vandergrift.




# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER




# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



The Plan had two landing zones. A reinforced battalion would land at Florida Island, Tulagi and Gavutu, the latter were held by the Japanese.

The bulk of the Marines would land on Guadalcanal near the unfinished airfield.



Carriers to the south would provide air cover for two days, after which they would withdraw to refuel.

The supply ships would unload as fast as possible – and depart within 3 to 5 days to return to Espiritu Santo for more supplies (and hopefully the Marines' artillery).

# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



It was America's largest military operation to date. The fleet had 81 ships – more than had been at Pearl Harbor. Its three carriers had 243 planes. It had 20 scout planes from the battleship and cruisers. An additional 271 planes were based nearby.

Some 23,000 Marines were embarked in the transports.

They faced about 1,500 Japanese, only about half of whom were combat troops and most of those were on Tulagi.

Guadalcanal had but one Company of troops, the rest being engineers who were building the air strip.



CV	3
BB	1
CA	11
CL	3
DD	31
DMS	5
AO	5
AP	12
APD	4
AK	6

# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



The first warning the Japanese had was when the shells from the fleet began falling before dawn on August 7<sup>th</sup>, 1942.

For most of the landing force, the landing went smoother than any exercise.



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



The assault was supported by carrier aircraft that bombed targets and provided fighter cover.

The Japanese on Guadalcanal fled once they saw the ships. They left behind most of their supplies and all of their equipment which was still in working order.





# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



**There was heavy fighting on Tulagi and Gavutu. The 866 defenders were wiped out at a cost of 122 Marines. Only 13 died at Guadalcanal – most in accidents.**



**The Marines took the airstrip without a fight and took many prisoners among the Japanese construction battalion who apparently did not get the word to run.**



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



On August 8<sup>th</sup>, the Japanese counter-attacked with a large air raid. The Americans picked it up on radar and were ready. 36 Japanese planes, over 2/3 of the strike, were shot down. They damaged a transport and a destroyer.



The transport was scuttled once it was unloaded.



# OPERATION WATCHTOWER



**By sunset, August 8<sup>th</sup>, the landings had achieved all of their objectives.**

**But there were problems. Supplies were piling up on the beaches because no one was moving them off the beach.**


**The Carriers had lost 20% of their fighters due to accidents and enemy action (more than at either Midway or Coral Sea) and were due to retire to refuel that night.**



**Turner called his senior commanders to discuss the situation. He planned to complete unloading, but the supplies had to be moved.**

**Meanwhile, real trouble was approaching...**

# Battle of Savo Island



# BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND



**On August 8<sup>th</sup>, a Japanese force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer left Rabaul.**

**Under the command of Rear Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, its goal was to attack the invasion forces at night and destroy the transports and supply ships.**

**A patrol from Australia spotted the force but the report misidentified the ships and the possible destination.**





**Turner believed the report – that a force including two seaplane tenders was headed for one of the islands to the northeast.**

**The good news would be the Japanese would fail in their stated mission. But the failure would still be a disaster for the Americans...**




# BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND

The Japanese mauled both cruiser forces defending the beaches. But it had fired all its torpedoes and over half of its ammunition doing so and with dawn Mikawa was certain would come hoards of carrier bombers. He decided not to press his luck. He left four Allied cruisers sunk or sinking and a fifth heavily damaged.



# BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND



The Japanese had long before decided to concentrate on night surface action and torpedoes. (Their Type 93 torpedo was the best in the war). They chose to focus on night tactics because the Americans had not.

The Americans had done well with air warfare. But in the first surface engagement of the war they were taken by surprise and out fought.

1,077 Allied sailors had died against only 129 Japanese. Far worse, the transports were now defenseless.

Turner continued to unload as much as he could. He pulled out after sunset on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 1942, one day early.

The Japanese cruiser Kako would be sunk by a U.S. sub returning to port.





# **BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND**

**To this day, a myth exists within the U.S. Marine Corps that the United States Navy turned tail after Savo Island and abandoned the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.**

- The Carriers had left without warning.**
- Turner left with most of the supplies still aboard.**

**The truth is different.**

- The Carriers left on schedule – although earlier than either Turner or Vandegrift had wanted. But as VADM Fletcher was senior and as Ghormley had not been at the planning meetings to overrule him (assuming he would have) the schedule was what it was.**
- Turner left one day early because he not only had lost his air cover but his surface force as well. Still, he managed to unload over 75% of the supplies (much of which was lost on the beach by Japanese air attack – the whole point of the meeting on the night of August 8<sup>th</sup>.)**

**The basis for the myth is what happened over the next two months – namely the lack of adequate resupply. This was due in no small part to VADM Ghormley not willing to take the risk while the seas were contested and hard pressed to end the contest in favor of the U.S.**

# “OPERATION SHOE STRING”



# OPERATION SHOE STRING



Guadalcanal was what is known as a “meeting engagement.” Neither side chose to fight a major campaign there. It was important because that was where the fight was. It was unknown before and forgotten soon after.

The forces met on ground neither held but both felt compelled to fight over.

At no time was more than 10% of the island occupied by both sides.



The winner would be the side that could send the men and keep them supplied.

For both sides, the logistics would prove to be the largest problem. Malaria running a close second. For Japan, it would be called “Starvation Island.”

# OPERATION SHOE STRING



Both sides would have problems with supply and reinforcement.

The Marines had every reason to complain. They found themselves using Japanese equipment and eating Japanese food left behind when the enemy ran into the jungle.

But the Japanese were often worse off. They often ran out of food after less than a week and rarely got resupplied.




They were at the far end of a supply line far more precarious than the Americans imagined – and much more so than the Americans themselves.

But both sides had one problem in common.

Oil.

# OIL SHORTAGES



**Japan had captured Borneo and Java and the oil fields. But there were no refineries. Oil had to be shipped to refineries in Japan and Formosa.**

**Then it had to be shipped to places like Trunk and Rabaul where the operational forces were located. Their operations were tied to the arrival of oil.**

**For the United States military, getting oil was not the problem, getting it to the South Pacific where it was needed was. There was a critical shortage of tankers. Most were in the Atlantic and would stay where they were (or get sunk by U-boats). Until shipbuilders got going, the Pacific had to make do and that meant oil was always a headache.**



# OPERATION SHOE STRING



The Japanese did not know how many Marines were on Guadalcanal, just that they were.

They assumed it was not much more than what they had before – construction crews with some troops. They assumed no more than 3,000 and probably less.

17<sup>th</sup> Army (HQ Rabaul) was assigned to get rid of the Americans. Its commander was LGEN Harukichi Hyakutake (above).


The 35<sup>th</sup> Brigade (at Palau), 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment (at the Philippines), and 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry (Ichiki) Regiment (at Guam) were assigned to evict the Americans.



The 28<sup>th</sup> was named after its commander COL Kiyonao Ichiki. The regiment had distinguished itself in China. An advanced force of 917 men landed from destroyers east of the Marine perimeter on August 19<sup>th</sup>, 1942.

They and their commander were confident they were more than enough to deal with the situation...

# OPERATION SHOE STRING



The Japanese attacked the east end of the Marine perimeter on August 21<sup>st</sup>.

777 Japanese were killed including COL Ichiki. 15 were taken prisoner. The survivors retreated to the east to their landing site to await reinforcements and orders.

Neither came. Most died of wounds or starvation.

43 Marines died in what became known as the Battle of Alligator Creek.

It foreshadowed the rest of the campaign and arguably the rest of the war.

It also meant the Japanese Army had to take Guadalcanal seriously and they were not in a position to do so.



# MEANWHILE...

A half a world away, on August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1942, the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Britain launched its first air raid on the continent of Europe.

12 B-17 bombers escorted by RAF Spitfires attacked the rail marshaling yard in Rouen, France. No planes were lost or damaged in the raid and the bombs more or less hit their target – a great success.

The raid was led by its squadron commander, MAJ Paul Tibbets.





# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



MacArthur had been opposed to Guadalcanal. It had little strategic purpose being too far from anywhere important. (It would gain one by becoming a point of contention).

He also would not be in command.

He also felt he did not have the resources and forces necessary. Besides, it was a side show from his perspective. It would not defend Australia and the Australians were still convinced the Japanese were coming.

They had decided to build a defensive line north of Brisbane and covering only the most populated areas.

After the failed Japanese invasion of Port Moresby, MacArthur decided the best place to defend Australia was in New Guinea.



# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



By June, 1942, MacArthur had 15 divisions at his disposal ... on paper. He had the 32<sup>nd</sup> and 41<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisions (US), but they were both barely trained.

He had 10 Australian infantry divisions and 3 armored. The armored divisions may have had enough equipment for a battalion or two.

Of the 10 infantry divisions, 7 were even less prepared than their American counterparts.

Only the two divisions from Africa (6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>) and the 7<sup>th</sup> were deemed trained (at least for a desert war).

In July, Japan made the next move...



# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



Beginning on July 12<sup>th</sup>, 1942, the Japanese 144<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 55<sup>th</sup> Division landed at Gona on the north coast of New Guinea. It had been the regiment assigned to the aborted invasion of Port Moresby in May.

The Japanese Army command at Rabaul decided that it would be easier to take Port Moresby over land than by an amphibious operation.

They assumed they could build a road to support their assault along a well used foot path over the Owen Stanley range. They also assumed that the defenders would prove little difficulty being little more than a handful of plantation owners with rifles and some indigenous troops of little ability.

They were terribly wrong...



# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



Facing the Japanese was the 39<sup>th</sup> Independent Battalion, basically an under strength militia unit and the Papuan Constabulary.

The Japanese troops from the 144<sup>th</sup> Regiment had fought in Burma which merely meant if they went walking in the woods most might not get lost in the first hours. But there had been roads in Burma.



The 39<sup>th</sup> and Constabulary, by contrast, knew about jungles. The Papuans were fighting on home ground.

The fight was a delaying action. It was ambush warfare and guerrilla tactics. Japanese who lost touch with their squads were never seen again.

And when there was a battle, the Japanese were outfought.

# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



**Kokoda was a village north of the Owen Stanley Range and the critical ground between the Japanese landings and the mountains.**

**It was on a plateau and had a crude airstrip that was used to bring in supplies and a handful of small units from the 7<sup>th</sup> Australian Infantry Division gathering at Port Moresby.**



**On July 29<sup>th</sup>, the Japanese attacked. They lost 500 men taking the airfield and assumed they had faced an entire regiment.**

**They had faced barely 140 men.**

**But it was a victory and the Japanese sent in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 51<sup>st</sup> divisions for their drive on Port Moresby.**

# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



During the fighting withdrawal over the Owens-Stanley range, the Australian and Papuans were always outnumbered and yet usually held their ground or gave ground grudgingly and after inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese.

The Japanese always assumed they were outnumbered but being better soldiers were able to succeed.

Both sides had to contend with a hostile wilderness. But the Australians had the Papuans support. The Japanese squandered any chance of that in the first days with the result being the Papuans who were not working directly with the Australians were in the jungle hunting Japanese.



Contrary to Japanese assertions, there is no evidence of cannibals. Head hunting, however...

# KOKODA TRAIL – Heart of Darkness...



On September 17<sup>th</sup>, 1942, the Japanese had crossed over the 8,000 foot Owens Stanley range and reached Ioribaiwa, within sight of Port Moresby. The next day they attacked the Australians entrenched on Imita Ridge.

It was not the scattered forces that had mauled the Japanese piece by piece for months but the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division.



The Japanese were slaughtered and fell back under heavy counter-attack. In the process, what food and supplies they had carried over the mountains were overrun.

The Japanese were in full retreat and their general was advised there would be no reinforcements – Guadalcanal had become more important...

# CACTUS AIR FORCE



**On August 20<sup>th</sup>, 1942, USS Long Island (the Navy's first Escort Carrier) launched planes towards Guadalcanal.**

**The 18 F4F fighters and 12 Dauntless dive bombers were not sent to attack the Japanese, but to land at newly named "Henderson Field" on Guadalcanal.**

**They began combat operations the next day.**



**They were the first of a rag tag collection of Marine, Army and orphaned Navy squadrons that was known as the Cactus Air Force.**


**And an operational base made Guadalcanal strategically important to both the U.S. and the Japanese.**



# Battle of the Eastern Solomons



# Battle of the Eastern Solomons




# Battle of the Eastern Solomons



The Japanese had been planning a major reinforcement operation supported by their carriers both to protect the transports and to hopefully draw out and destroy the American Carriers.

By mid-August the American code breakers had again broken the new version of JN-25 so once again they were reading the mail.


The American Carriers were to turn back the invasion force (with support from Henderson Field) and deal with the Japanese carriers if possible.



The U.S. had Wasp, Enterprise and Saratoga against a main striking force of two carriers with a separate light carrier supporting the transports.

The battle began on August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1942.

# Battle of the Eastern Solomons



VADM Nagumo commanded the Japanese main carrier force. VADM Fletcher the Americans.


It was not a repeat of Midway for either side. On the eve of battle, Fletcher sent Wasp south to refuel.

The Japanese launched a strike against Henderson Field on the morning of Aug. 24<sup>th</sup>. The Cactus Air Force was waiting and savaged it.

Americans had already spotted the transports but now spotted the light carrier and attacked in the afternoon having not found the other Japanese carriers.

They sunk the light carrier Ryujo and damaged two other ships.

# Battle of the Eastern Solomons



**But Nagumo found them and damaged the Enterprise. A small scout force attacked his carriers but scored no hits and yet Nagumo chose to withdraw which caused the entire operation to be canceled.**

**The transports were attacked by dive bombers from Henderson Field the next day. One was sunk.**



**The battle prevented a major Japanese landing but it would see VADM Fletcher relieved. His lack of aggression and his decision to send Wasp off were the cause.**

**(ADM King did not like him which was never a good thing. Nimitz did but could no longer defend him so he was sent back to the states.)**

# Battle of the Eastern Solomons



The planes from Enterprise would be sent to the other two carriers and Guadalcanal. Enterprise returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs and would be back in five weeks.

The U.S. had lost a total of twenty planes, including a handful from Henderson Field.


At least six were shot down over their own carriers by their own ships.



The Japanese lost 70 planes and crews, all shot down. Their strikes against the U.S. carriers were shot apart by the improved ship gunnery.

But a major fleet effort was not the only way to send men and supplies to Guadalcanal and an unusual method had recently been successful...

# THE TOKYO EXPRESS



**It had begun not long after the Marines had landed because there were not enough transports in theater.**

**The Ichiki force arrived on Guadalcanal on destroyers as would most of the Japanese.**

**They were fast and could usually avoid air attacks from Henderson Field. Transports could not.**



**It was never intended to be more than a temporary expedient and many of the naval actions that followed – including the Eastern Solomons – were efforts to get larger transports to Guadalcanal.**

**Most all of those efforts failed.**

**The Japanese had to rely on the smaller but faster destroyers.**

# THE TOKYO EXPRESS



The destroyers proved surprisingly effective at bringing in troops quickly. Enough so that eventually the U.S. Navy would make significant efforts to stop them.



In a period of a month during which a major transport force was turned back at the Eastern Solomons, the destroyers delivered the balance of the 28<sup>th</sup> Regiment (Ichiki's), the 124<sup>th</sup> Regiment and the 35<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade – over 6,000 men under MGEN Kawaguchi.

What the destroyers were not good at doing was bringing in supplies in any quantities. But the Japanese felt it was not immediately necessary. Once they crushed the Marines, the supplies would follow...



# FLETCHER CONTROVERSY

VADM Fletcher's relief has been highly controversial. He was mild mannered, humble and unlike too many others not a self promoter.

He is also the only Admiral in history to win three carrier battles without a loss: Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons (albeit one win being greater than the others).

But he was not and never was an aviator which annoyed Admiral King to no end – as was his mild mannered, humble disposition.

He was also hated by Douglas MacArthur. Fletcher won the Medal of Honor in Mexico in 1916 for rescuing U.S. civilians from Mexican insurgents. MacArthur had done something similar but had received no recognition whatsoever.

Then again, Fletcher was ordered to do so. MacArthur was either on leave or AWOL and not ordered to do anything...



# FLETCHER CONTROVERSY

**But the nail in Fletcher's reputational coffin was hammered in by a civilian dressed in a naval uniform.**

**Prior to 1942, Samuel Eliot Morrison was a Harvard history professor who had never served at sea in any capacity. He was, however, a noted historian of maritime history and as such convinced the Navy (ADM King) to give him a commission to observe and write the history of the Navy's war.**

**After Midway, Morrison wanted to interview Fletcher – at 0730 the day after Fletcher returned from over six months at sea and was “on leave” for two days to get some sleep before going out again. Fletcher refused, but would agree to a meeting after lunch. Morrison saw this as disrespectful as he was, after all, a Harvard Professor who did not need to adjust his schedule to others so he refused.**

**And told Admiral King that in his opinion, Fletcher was the only reason things in the South Pacific were not going well.**



# FLETCHER CONTROVERSY

With that report and over the vociferous objection of ADM Nimitz, King fired Fletcher and transferred him to shore duty in Alaska. Fletcher never served at sea again.

It should be noted, before Fletcher fought in his first carrier battle, it was assumed that the go to admiral for carrier battle was VADM Halsey.

Halsey would fight in one sea battle against carriers without planes.

The other admiral with more than one carrier battle under his belt was Spruance with two. But one was as Fletcher's subordinate and the other, while he was in overall command, Marc Mitscher commanded the carrier task forces.

There was someone responsible for the perceived fiasco in the South Pacific, but he had been hand picked for the job by Roosevelt and King and his end would require even greater disasters...




# OPERATION SHOE STRING



**USS Hornet had not been involved in the Guadalcanal Operations. It had been retained in Hawaiian waters just in case the Japanese tried something.**

**When Naval Intelligence was convinced (and convinced Washington) that the Japanese were entirely committed to the Solomons and New Guinea, Hornet was sent south.**



**She arrive on August 29<sup>th</sup>, just in time to replace the damaged Enterprise which was already returning to Hawaii for repairs.**

**Unfortunately, two days after Hornet arrived, a Japanese submarine torpedoed the Saratoga (again). It did not sink, but it too had to return north.**

**Its planes wound up at Guadalcanal as part of the Cactus Air Force.**

# BLOODY RIDGE


**The newly arrived Japanese planned a full-scale frontal assault hoping to overwhelm the Marine lines. They had not scouted the ground.**

**They had not gathered unnoticed. They made too much noise. The Marines knew they were out there and where they were likely to strike.**

**And their plans failed to take into account the dense jungle. Units could not see much less coordinate with their neighboring units so when the attack came it went in piecemeal... (It didn't help that they went at night...)**



# BLOODY RIDGE



The attack began on Sep. 12<sup>th</sup> and was defended mostly by two battalions.

The main attack was parallel to a high ridge that stuck out from the Marine lines.

The Marines had fortified the position in anticipation of the attack and were prepared to fall back if need be.

They would, but not as far as their main line of resistance. "They came in stupid," one Marine would say.

# BLOODY RIDGE



The fighting lasted through Sep 14<sup>th</sup>. The attacks were massed assaults against machineguns backed by artillery and uncoordinated.

While the Marines gave ground, all the attacks were thrown back.

80 Marines were killed, 204 wounded.



# BLOODY RIDGE



**The Japanese lost over 800 killed in the fighting plus hundreds wounded – many of whom would die for lack of treatment.**

**They would try and regroup to the west, losing hundreds more to Marine patrols or the jungle.**

**It was by far the largest defeat the Japanese had in ground combat since December 7<sup>th</sup>.**




**They now saw Guadalcanal as critical and pulled support from the effort to take Port Moresby to send everything they could to Guadalcanal to retake the island and avenge the defeat.**

**It would not work out that way at all.**

**It was the only time the Marines were concerned about the outcome...**



# OPERATION SHOE STRING



**VADM Ghormley only saw disaster. On Sep. 15<sup>th</sup> the USS Wasp and USS Hornet were escorting a convoy with a Marine regiment (1<sup>st</sup> Mar. Div. had left a regiment to guard Fiji) and supplies to Guadalcanal.**

**The Japanese sub I-19 fired what has since been called the most destructive salvo in history - six torpedoes at maximum range.**

**One hit and sank the destroyer USS O'Brien. Two just missed another destroyer and a cruiser. One hit the battleship USS North Carolina.**

**Two hit the USS Wasp causing flooding and starting a fire that was soon out of control because the fire mains were destroyed.**

**The Wasp was abandoned and scuttled. The U.S. had only one carrier in theater. The convoy made it safely.**



# OPERATION SHOE STRING

ADM Nimitz (and by extension ADM King) were now getting conflicting reports from the South Pacific.

From Guadalcanal, the reports were optimistic that success was possible. Supply could be improved but it was nowhere near critical.

But MGEN Vandergrift was not in command of the entire operation. VADM Ghormley was and his reports made it seem like the U.S. was on the brink of a disaster equal to what befell the Army in the Philippines. Supplies were entirely too little, too late and without massive reinforcement the situation was lost.

It could not come at a worse time. The Allies in Europe were planning for the invasion of North Africa and the British wanted everything the Americans had at the expense of their problems in the Pacific. And MacArthur was more than willing to be pessimistic if it meant more soldiers and materiel would be sent his way.

True, they were currently down to just one aircraft carrier. But Ghormley had more ships of every other type. And Nimitz knew from his Intelligence that while the Japanese knew the general situation, they were not in a position to take immediate advantage.

# OPERATION SHOE STRING



**Nimitz travelled to the South Pacific, arriving at Noumea, New Caledonia on Sep 29. He met with VADM Ghormley, RADM Turner, MGEN Patch (Americal Division), MGEN Harmon (Air Forces South Pacific), and members from MacArthur's command.**

**He asked Ghormley many pointed questions.**

**If things were so dire why was there an entire Army division (the Americal) on New Caledonia and not on Guadalcanal?**

**Why had the Navy done nothing to stop the Japanese from reinforcing?**

**Why hadn't Ghormley gone to Guadalcanal and seen for himself?**

**He did not receive answers.**



# OPERATION SHOE STRING



**Nimitz then went to Guadalcanal arriving the next day. He handed out more than a few medals including one to a Marine who promptly passed out (having never met an Admiral, he later said).**

**He also met with Vandergrift and his staff and reviewed the situation.**

**He found nothing to be terribly frightened about (except malaria).**



**Vandergrift primary complaint was that it seemed to him that the Navy was unwilling to risk its ships and stop the Japanese from building up its forces.**

**Nimitz left with serious questions about his theater commander.**

# BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE



The pressure to risk his ships was not just from Nimitz. Ghormley's subordinates were eager as well. VADM Turner wanted to take any risk so long as the Japanese ability to supply Guadalcanal was ended.

And RADM Norman Scott, who commanded a cruiser force wanted to unleash his ships on the Japanese rather than following the one carrier around.


Cruisers and destroyers were built to fight other ships.

He trained his ships whenever operations allowed and felt his ships could fight the Japanese ... at night even ... and win.


But although there was a plan, Ghormley had always held back.



# BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE



# BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE



**RADM Scott would get his chance soon. On Oct 9, Navy Intelligence intercepted orders for a reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal.**

**Scott was detached from escort duty with Hornet to cut off and destroy the convoy.**


**He had two heavy cruisers and two light cruisers with five destroyers. What neither he nor Naval Intelligence knew was that there was also an enemy force of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers ahead of the convoy.**



**This was part of an all out offensive against Guadalcanal and Henderson field. The cruisers were the first force sent specifically to bombard the airstrip.**

**The night battle began at 2346 on October 11<sup>th</sup>...**

# BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE





# BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE



The fight was short and fierce. The Americans used radar (with varying effectiveness) and savaged the Japanese bombardment force in a night fight that had favored the Japanese only weeks earlier.

One Japanese Cruiser was sunk. Another heavily damaged. One destroyer was sunk. 454 were killed including the admiral. 111 POWs were picked up.



On the U.S. side, one destroyer was sunk and another damaged. USS Boise was heavily damaged.

The destroyer convoy was attacked the next day by planes from Henderson field. The ensuing action saw two of the destroyers sunk and the rest heading back for Rabaul.

# **“I don’t think we have a navy...”**




**The “myth” that the Navy had abandoned the Marines on Guadalcanal finds no reference before October 1942.**

**Meaning: nothing written by Marines at the time suggests they felt the Navy had left them high and dry.**

**That changed on October 13<sup>th</sup>, 1942.**

**The Battle of Cape Esperance had interrupted but not stopped a major Japanese effort to destroy the air strip and defeat the Marines.**



**On October 13<sup>th</sup>, the Japanese battleships Kongo and Haruna pulled in just off Lunga Point and shelled Henderson Field for over an hour with their 14” guns.**

**Ghormley sent a panicked message predicting doom – a copy to the Marines.**

# **“I don’t think we have a navy...”**



**Nimitz sent Halsey south. Halsey had recovered and was chief of Nimitz’s air staff. He was told to assess the situation in general and whether Ghormley was fit to continue specifically. (Nimitz was convinced the man was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.)**

**The Japanese returned the next night with two heavy cruisers. The next day, they arrived again with cargo ships to unload troops and supplies.**



**The Navy was nowhere in sight. What few planes that were not damaged with what little fuel that remained took off and crippled three of the cargo ships, but the unloading continued.**

**MGEN Roy Geiger – in command of the savaged Cactus Air Force noted: “I don’t think we have a navy.”**

# **“I don’t think we have a navy...”**




**The Japanese returned again on the night of October 15<sup>th</sup>.**

**At Pearl Harbor, Nimitz staff all but demanded the immediate relief of Ghormley. Nimitz cabled King saying he was considering it. King’s reply was one word: “Approved.”**

**Halsey found out on the boat from his plane to Ghormley’s flagship at Noumea on October 16<sup>th</sup>. He was handed a message telling him effective immediately he was in command.**

**He was stunned.**

**The men in the South Pacific were elated once word got out ... and it did ... very quickly. One would think the Japanese had surrendered.**



# LAST GASPS OF A DYING ARMY...

## JAPANESE

- 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment Aug 18 – 24  
~ 1,500 men
- 35<sup>th</sup> Brigade Aug 29 – Sep 5  
~ 6,000 men
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division Sep 5 – Oct 4  
~ 15,000 men
- 38<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (-) Nov 5 – 15  
~ 9,000 men



## U.S. MARINE CORPS

- 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (-) Aug 7  
~15,000 men
- 1<sup>st</sup> Raider Battalion Aug 7  
~1,500 men
- 1<sup>st</sup> Parachute Battalion Aug 7  
~1,500 men
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment Aug 7  
~5,000 men
- 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment Sep 18  
~5,000 men
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division (-) Dec 10  
~15,000 men

## U.S. Army

### (Americal Division)

- 164<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment Oct 15  
~5,000 men (NDNG)
- 182<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment Nov 12  
~5,000 men (MANG)
- 132<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment Dec 8  
~5,000 men (ILNG)

# LAST GASPS OF A DYING ARMY...



**Halsey barely had time to get settled in before the Japanese launched their largest offensive effort yet.**

**On October 20<sup>th</sup>, the Japanese were supposed to attack the Marine perimeter with a division plus a brigade – around 20,000 men. This was known to American intelligence.**


**Despite receiving over 10,000 reinforcements since landing, the Marines numbered about 23,000 thanks to almost an equal number lost mainly to malaria.**

**The plan was to take Henderson field and then their Navy would attack.**

**But the plan did not account for jungle and the attack was delayed until the Japanese could get things where they needed to be...**



# LAST GASPS OF A DYING ARMY...



# LAST GASPS OF A DYING ARMY...



The attack went in on the 23<sup>rd</sup> without artillery support (they could not move the guns through the jungle).

The fighting lasted four days.

On the 24<sup>th</sup>, a report reached Rabaul and Truk that the Japanese had taken Henderson field.



No one told the Marines. But about a platoon of dead Japanese was found nearby after the battle (close enough that the Japanese officer might have seen it, but hardly threatening the field.)

Contrary to what they had believed, the Cactus Air Force was not out of the fight and by the 23<sup>rd</sup> had been resupplied with gasoline. They pounded the Japanese and a resupply convoy.



# LAST GASPS OF A DYING ARMY...



**It was the largest Japanese land offensive on Guadalcanal and the last. It turned out no better for the Japanese Army than any of their prior attempts.**

**Around 3,000 Japanese were killed.**


**All of their tanks were knocked out (and unlike the Americans, they could not fix them again.)**

**The Marines lost 86 KIA.**

**It would turn out that during the Guadalcanal campaign the mosquito was far more dangerous than the Japanese Army. Far more Americans were victims of malaria and dengue fever than Japanese ordinance.**




# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ


In late August, 1942, Yamamoto moved his headquarters from Kure, near Hiroshima Japan to Truk in the Caroline Islands. His headquarters was aboard the Japanese battleship Yamato – the largest ever built – so it was a simple matter of moving the ship.



It proved more than a boon to U.S. Naval Intelligence. At Kure, he could use the telephone to discuss his plans with the Navy staff in Tokyo. At Truk, he had to use radio and while some messages were probably sent in a high level code the U.S. never broke, enough were sent in JN-25.

By October, the U.S. knew the Japanese plans. Not in detail, for they never were able to read every word, but more than enough to counter the Japanese if possible.

# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



This would be the last carrier battle for over eighteen months and the last where Japan had a numerical advantage in ships or planes.

The Americans again knew some of the Japanese plan. They did not know that the carrier Junyo was taking part ... fortunately it proved to be too little, too late.

U.S.	Japan
73 F4F	60 A6M
74 SDB	44 D3A
28 TBF	53 B5N
2 CV	3 CV
*	1 CVL
1 BB	4 BB
3 CA	7 CA
3 CL	4 CL
14 DD	32 DD
*	4 TR



# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



The two sides found each other at about the same time and attacked at about the same time. Halsey heard the reports at his headquarter and sent unsolicited advice: “Strike, I repeat, Strike!”

The U.S. strike went for the Zuiho (Junyo being unobserved) and wrecked its flight deck. (It would not sink, however.)

The Japanese arrived and found only the USS Hornet. Enterprise was then hidden in a nearby rain squall. But it was enough. They crippled the Hornet leaving it dead in the water.

Enterprise launched a second strike later which found Shokaku and crippled it, although it did not lose power. But it had tangled with a Japanese strike on the way in and that strike found the Enterprise.



# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



**Enterprise was heavily damaged but the only damage in need of a shipyard was to the forward elevator.**

**RADM Kinkaid, commanding the force, ordered it to withdraw leaving Hornet with the cruiser Northampton to try and tow it to port and two destroyers.**

**Junyo soon found the Hornet. Despite the apparent success so far, only Junyo still had pilots and undamaged planes.**

**It struck the cripple three times, but only one torpedo hit was critical. After the torpedo hit the ship was abandoned and ordered to be scuttled.**

**Two destroyers fired all their torpedoes. None worked. They then fired some 500 rounds into the ship but did nothing.**



# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



**A Japanese surface force was closing fast, just below the horizon. The three ships left Hornet and fled to the south at top speed.**

**The Japanese found Hornet abandoned and crippled.**

**They briefly contemplated taking it as a prize, but realized it was too damaged for it to make it to port. They sank it with two torpedoes.**



**The Japanese did not follow up. Their air wings had been mauled, mostly by thick anti-aircraft fire over the U.S. fleet. They were also critically low on fuel both at sea and in general.**

**Finally, as their Army had utterly failed in their attack, the entire mission had lost its importance. They withdrew.**




# THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ



**While the U.S. Navy had lost 81 planes, only 20 aircrew were lost. Most of the planes had ditched near ships when it was not possible to land on their carriers.**

**Japanese lost 99 planes but more critically 143 aircrew including half their torpedo bomber crews, 40% of their dive bomber crews and 20% of their fighter pilots.**



**60% of their trained carrier pilots had died in the war. For senior pilots – squadron, group and flight leaders – it was over 80% dead. They had lost three years worth of pilots.**

**The U.S. only had one (damaged) carrier in the fight, but with no pilots to man others, Japan also only had one left. (The U.S. would not know that until after the war.)**

# **“BULL” HALSEY**



**Hawaii had been inundated with reports about a lack of supplies and ships from Admiral Ghormley. When Halsey arrived in theater, he found a harbor filled with loaded transport ships waiting to unload. They had been there for weeks in some cases.**


**Ghormley had been assigned as a naval liaison officer in Britain before being sent to the Pacific and was acutely sensitive to host nation demands. Halsey was never diplomatic. The French Governor General – loyal to Vichy – allowed the Americans a single slip and small**

**warehouse for supplies and insisted personnel remain aboard ship insofar as possible.**

**Halsey placed him under house arrest, commandeered any land he needed for warehousing, barracks, training facilities, airfields and whatever else was needed, interred the Japanese consulate and its staff and seized the building for his Headquarters while turning the French Consular General’s compound into an officer’s club.**

**The Americans and Free French government loved him...**

# **“BULL” HALSEY**



**On October 25<sup>th</sup>, 1942, the SS President Coolidge carrying over 5,000 troops of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division struck a mine entering the harbor at Espiritu Santo. Only two lives were lost. The ship grounded itself near shore and everyone else got off – most merely having to wade to the beach.**

**All the supplies were lost when the ship capsized and slid into deeper water the next day.**

**What is striking is while this is mentioned in SOPAC’s daily reports, there were no other messages about the incident.**

**One wonders how VADM Ghormley would have reacted given the loss did upset time tables.**

# **THE NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL**

**The U.S. was down to one (semi) operational carrier. Enterprise was mostly repaired at Noumea within two weeks, but no one wanted to bet on whether the forward elevator worked so it was locked in the up position.**

**As a result, it could either launch airplanes or land them, not both, greatly reducing efficiency and limiting it to using no more than about one third to one half of its planes at any one time.**

**The Japanese continued to try and bomb Henderson field, but the Cactus Air Force had mostly recovered so the Japanese raids were by night – hitting Jungle as often as not.**

**The Tokyo Express continued to run, but less effectively given U.S. air superiority in the eastern Solomon Islands.**

**But the Japanese had not yet given up.**

**They planned another major effort ... but without carrier air support.**

**The U.S. knew it was coming ... and were uncertain if they could truly stop it.**

# THE NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL



Intelligence learned a Japanese convoy was planned to arrive off Guadalcanal on November 14<sup>th</sup> and that the Japanese hoped to neutralize Henderson Field and control the seas as they had done in October by heavy bombardment.


Two battleships were to bombard Henderson on the night of Nov 12<sup>th</sup>.



The U.S. had little to stop them. Halsey assigned the task to RADM Callaghan and RADM Scott. Callaghan had been Ghormley's Chief-of-Staff and now commanded cruisers.

They were both assigned to escort convoys to Guadalcanal and once there to form up and attack the Japanese battleships.

# THE NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL



The U.S. would throw two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and eight destroyers against two battleships (Hiei and Kirishima – technically battlecruisers), one light cruiser and eleven destroyers.

No one who knew thought the U.S. force stood much of a chance.

It was night and while the U.S. had the enemy on radar they held fire ... until point blank range.

The battle was a confused melee. Both sides shot at anything ... including their own ships.

The U.S. forces was mauled but the Japanese had been driven off.

