


THE PACIFIC WAR



**December
7th**


1941



































































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

















THE PACIFIC WAR



“Let me say one thing: I do believe that we are going to have a major war with Japan and Germany, and that the war is going to start by a very serious surprise attack and defeat of U.S. armed forces and that there is going to be a major revulsion on the part of the political power in Washington against all those in command at sea, and they’re all going to be thrown out though it won’t be their fault necessarily.”

CAPT Chester Nimitz in a letter to his son MIDN Chester Nimitz, Jr., 1937.

“In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectations of success.”

**ADM Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet,
December 1940.**

America's Other Forgotten War?

Countless volumes have been written on the War in Europe (1939 – 1945).

Fewer have been written on the War in the Pacific. In that regard, Pearl Harbor is, perhaps, the most common topic. The Battle of Midway is another common topic. And it falls off from there. The relatively few historians who do focus on the Pacific call themselves the Cult of Pacific War Historians.

A “total” coverage of the Pacific War is often presented as a subset in a course or work on the United States in World War II.

The Pacific war dominated the headlines in the U.S. from December 7th, 1941 until the end of 1942. On November 8th, 1942, six divisions of U.S. Soldiers invaded North Africa.

By the end of 1942, Guadalcanal in the Solomons was secure and from that point on news from the European Theater generally garnered the front page until May 1945.

“The Cult of the Pacific War Historians”

This has only begun to change. Hornfisher’s work on the Battle Off Samar, the naval campaign for Guadalcanal and invasion of the Marianas began reintroducing this. More recent works by Jonathan Parshall, Ian Tull, (my former professor) Craig Symonds and others are also adding to the available materials.

More recently, documentaries have been published on YouTube and other sources focusing on the Pacific and Asian wars to include:

The Unauthorized Pacific War Podcast.

Kings and Generals: The Pacific War week by week – a very good look at Australia’s role and Burma.

Time Ghost History: World War II Week by Week.

They use real historians and are both very in depth and very thorough but ... I won’t do a class on them as they are not yet finished and each is already well over 40 hours of content.

America's Other Forgotten War?

You Probably Heard of:

Operation Torch
Operation Overlord
Salerno
Monte Casino
Anzio
Normandy
Omaha Beach
The Battle of the Bulge
Bastogne
The 8th Air Force
Rome
Paris
Operation Market Garden
The Rhine River
General George S. Patton
General Omar Bradley
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Have You Heard of:

The Kokoda Trail?
Cape Esperance?
Milne Bay?
Empress Augusta Bay?
Cape Gloucester?
Los Negros?
Aitape?
Biak?
Noemfoor?
Operation Cartwheel?
Makin Atoll
Operation Forager?
The 20th Air Force?
The Alamo Scouts?
General Walter Krueger?
General Roy Geiger?
General Tomoyuki Yamashita?

America's Other Forgotten War?

June 6th 1944

Operation Overlord

Invasion of Normandy

6 Infantry Divisions, 3 Airborne Divisions invade Normandy France.

150,000 men are landed in the first day.

They crossed about 100 miles of sea in some 4,000 vessels – fewer than 800 were truly ocean going.

The Germans flew only two sorties against the invasion on that day that reached the beaches.

The German Navy was not a factor.

June 15th 1944

Operation Forager

Invasion of the Mariana Islands

6 Divisions embarked to invade Saipan, Tinian and Guam.

Over 166,000 soldiers and Marines are in the invasion force, over 20,000 land on the first day.

Over 600 ships sail mainly from Hawaii to the Marianas, a distance of over 3,700 miles. The closest supplies are at Eniwetok Atoll over 1,100 miles away.

The invasion provokes the largest air battle of the War and second largest fleet battle in history.

America's Other Forgotten War?

The battlefields of Europe and the memorials are rather easy to visit provided you journey to Europe. You can reach most places by rail or road once you are across the Atlantic.

North Africa is more difficult only because of the political situation. That being said, Morocco and El Alamein are not difficult to visit.

The easiest places to visit in the Pacific Theater are: Pearl Harbor, Luzon in the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa. Travel to Guam and Saipan is possible but not as easy. (It is easier to get to Saipan from Japan than the U.S.) Travel to Iwo Jima, Kwajalein, Wake Island and Midway all require permission from the governments. Travel to Eniwetok Atoll is both difficult and ill advised as it was the site of most U.S. above ground nuclear tests – 43 detonations totaling 31.8 megatons.

Travel to the Solomons and New Guinea is difficult, expensive (mostly by small planes or boats) and requires numerous inoculations. Most of these places are not on any travel agent's tour listings.

Sir John Keegan, OBE (1934 – 2012)

**Military Historian: Oxford University,
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.**

He argued that World War II was several separate and often unrelated wars that were fought at roughly the same time.

Each war had its independent causes, separate war aims, and separate conditions for peace such that an end of one war did not necessarily lead to an end to any of the other wars.

The War in Western Europe: 1939 – 45

The Soviet – German War: 1941 – 45

The Sino – Japanese War: 1937 – 45

The American – Japanese War: 1941 – 1945.



The war in China (known in the U.S. as the China-Burma-India Campaign) while critical to the outbreak of the Pacific War was of no real relevance once the latter war began.

It never saw more than a single regiment of U.S. ground troops engaged.

Air combat forces (fighters and bombers) were engaged but not in any significant numbers. The bulk of U.S. effort was supplying and advising the Chinese who welcomed the supplies but generally ignored all advice.

The Sino-Japanese War (CBI) began July 7th, 1937.

For the Pacific War, it employed no less than 70% of the Japanese ground forces and at least 60% of its Air Forces (1944) and often more.

The only major Japanese land defeats in China were against the Soviets. (1939 and 1945)

From December 1941 (actually from 1938) until late 1944, the war in China was a bloody stalemate.

Japan would only achieve limited success against China in it's Ichi-Go offensive from late 1944 until the end of the war.

This War ended when Japan was defeated by the Americans in the Pacific, not because of the military situation in China.

The Pacific War was America's War. It was fought without alliances. (Non-U.S. forces were both a small factor and fought under U.S. Command, not independent commands). It was also a naval war.



**“Land is nothing but an impediment to the free navigation of the seas.”
Unknown – a popular U.S. Navy expression**

Earth Surface Area:	196,944,000 sq. mi.	
Water Surface Area of the Earth:	139,434,000 sq. mi.	70.8%
Land Surface Area of the Earth:	57,510,000 sq. mi.	29.2%
Pacific Ocean Area:	63,780,000 sq. mi.	32.4%

SHORT WAR

This is probably the easiest to plan and the preferred option of a nation bent on aggression.

It is an “off the shelf” war, meaning if a nation does not have something on day one of the war it will not get it by the time the war ends.

It is easy to plan for as that nation should know what it has in its military and what it is therefore capable of doing. Likewise, that nation should know what its enemy has and what that enemy is capable of doing and therefore can plan accordingly.

And the political leadership can prosecute such a war without unduly burdening its economy and population. This is a war where the operational arts – planning, communication, (intelligence), tactics, doctrine and execution – are prominent features in success or failure.

It seldom has ever worked out that way.

This is because it takes two sides to make a war and the other side always gets to vote.

SHORT WAR

The Union and Confederacy marched off to war in 1861 expecting (and only prepared for) a short war.

The European powers marched off to war in August 1914 expecting a short war.

Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 expecting a short war. They invaded France in May 1940 still expecting a short war and they invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 expecting a short war.

Japan invaded China in July 1937 expecting a short war.

To break its stalemate in China, Japan launched its major offensive into southeast Asia in December 1941 expecting a short war.

LONG WAR

A long war is one where what either side has at the start will be exhausted well before the end for whatever reason.

This is a war where tactics and operational art might win battles but are of little relevance to the outcome of the war.

Such a war is a war of production, systems, and economies.

It will impose upon all belligerents immense costs in people, resources and finances.

Generally, the side that can sustain the huge burdens the longest wins. It also generally favors the stronger economy and more flexible social/political system.

Rarely has any nation seriously planned for such a war or set out to fight one from the start. Most often, the sides fall into it when their short war plan falls apart.

LONG WAR

The United States entered World War II expecting a long war.

True, by then it had become that.

True, in December 1941 the United States had only begun mobilization and at that time it knew what it had was not nearly enough.

But, unlike the other powers entering the war, the U.S. had been planning for a long war since the end of the last war. Moreover, there were no delusions in the U.S. military or government (for the most part) that it could be anything but a long war.

Why? The United States was not about to spend to maintain a military in peacetime capable of winning a short war against a “peer rival”. The post WWI treaties effectively made the ability to maintain a peacetime military that could deter aggression unlikely in the long term.

Thus, it knew more than a decade beforehand that the next war would be a war of mobilization and attrition.

THE LONG WAR OF 1941

Besides the obvious lack of military capability to defeat Japan and Germany in 1941 there was a far greater problem, one that would vex planners practically until the end.

Or more specifically two problems:

THE LONG WAR OF 1941

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Or more specifically two problems:

The Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.

THE LONG WAR OF 1941

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Or more specifically two problems:


The Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.

The U.S. could not march off to war. It had to get onto ships, sail across oceans, get off the ships and then, maybe, it could march off to war.


And that had its own problems, namely to get onto ships there had to be ships.

More specifically, there had to be enough ships for everything needed to fight and sustain an army; from men and weapons, to ammunition, to food, to toilet paper.

Shipping was crucial and in December 1941 there was not enough. Arguably there was never enough.



Right: A reproduction of a map used in briefing newly arrived officers to Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command as to the scale of their operational problem.



The Pacific War was a war of distance even as compared to the Atlantic and European Campaign. It was a war of logistics where distance between the base of supply and point of attack favored the Japanese.

San Diego CA to Manila Philippines	7,393 mi.	6,506 NM
San Diego CA to Brisbane Australia	7,202 mi.	6,338 NM
San Diego CA to Guam	6,170 mi.	5,430 NM
San Diego CA to Tokyo Japan	5,579 mi.	4,910 NM
San Diego CA to Honolulu HI	2,607 mi.	2,294 NM
Honolulu HI to Manila Philippines	5,296 mi.	4,660 NM
Honolulu HI to Brisbane Australia	4,701 mi.	4,137 NM
Honolulu HI to Tokyo Japan	3,854 mi.	3,392 NM
Honolulu HI to Guam	3,799 mi.	3,343 NM
Tokyo Japan to Manila Philippines	1,860 mi.	1,637 NM
Tokyo Japan to Guam	1,568 mi.	1,380 NM
New York City to London	3,459 mi.	3,044 NM
Chicago IL to San Diego CA	1,743 mi.	1,526 NM
London to Berlin	580 mi.	510 NM

New Guinea	303,381 sq. mi.	less than 15%
Texas	268,581 sq. mi.	
Illinois	57,914 sq. mi.	
Luzon, The Philippines	42,458 sq. mi.	~ 70%
New Britain, The Bismarck Islands	14,100 sq. mi.	~ 15%
Belgium	11,787 sq. mi.	100%
Bougainville, The Solomons	3,598 sq. mi.	~ 15%
Leyte, the Philippines	2,845 sq. mi.	
Guadalcanal, The Solomons	2,060 sq. mi.	>10%
Champaign County, Illinois	998 sq. mi.	
Admiralty Islands	810 sq. mi.	
New Georgia, The Solomons	786 sq. mi.	
Okinawa	466 sq. mi.	
Attu, the Aleutians	345 sq. mi.	
Guam	212 sq. mi.	
Saipan	45 sq. mi.	
Urbana IL	11.7 sq. mi.	
Iwo Jima	8.1 sq. mi.	
Kwajelein	6.3 sq. mi.	
Eniwetok	5.9 sq. mi.	
Makin Atoll	5.2 sq. mi.	
Peleliu	5.0 sq. mi.	
Wake Island	2.7 sq. mi.	
Betio, Tarawa	0.59 sq. mi.	

U.S. ARMY DEPLOYED WWII EUROPEAN THEATER

**52 Infantry Divisions
(4 Airborne)**

**208 Days in Combat / Div.
9,764 Casualties / Div.
46.94 casualties / day / Div.**

16 Armored Divisions

**149 Days in Combat / Div.
3,896 Casualties / Div.
26.15 casualties / day / Div.**

**Infantry Division: 12,000 – 15,000 men
Armored Division: 15,000 – 18,000 men
Marine Division: 19,500 – 25,000 men**

U.S. ARMY DEPLOYED WWII PACIFIC THEATER

**21 Divisions
(1 Airborne, 1 Cavalry, 0 Armored)**

**292 Days in Combat / Div.
4,475 casualties / Div.
15.33 casualties / day / Div.**

U.S. MARINES PACIFIC

6 Divisions

**148 Days in Combat / Div.
12,478 casualties / Div.
84.31 casualties / day / Div.**

**100% of the U.S. Marine Corps
combat power.**

80% of the U.S. Navy combat power.

**25% of the U.S. Army ground
forces.**

30% of the U.S. Army Air Forces.


**>70% of the Australian Forces after
1942 (less than a mere 5% of the
U.S. commitment.)**

<5% of the British and other allies.

**(All ANZAC and British under U.S.
Command)**

**The U.S. made up over 90% of the
allied forces engaged in total.**





Pacific Ocean Area (POA) included Central, South, Southeast and Northern Pacific Areas.

NORTH PACIFIC AREA
 XXXXX
 CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

POA NIMITZ

JAPANESE OUTER PERIMETER 2 JULY 1942

POA and SWPA under UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DIRECTION

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
 XXXXX
 SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC, 1941
 STATUS OF FORCES AND THEATER BOUNDARIES
 2 July 1942

0 400 800 1200 1600
 SCALE OF MILES

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DIRECTION

BRITISH STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Allied air bases under construction:
 ① Merauke

XXX
 NEW GUINEA FORCE

XXXXX
 SWPA
 MACARTHUR

XXXXX
 SOPA

XX
 1 MARINE
 VANDEGRIFT

DET Kawaguchi

KANGA FORCE

XXXX
 EIGHTH FLEET

XXXX
 SEVENTEENTH ARMY

XXXX
 MIKAWA

XXXX
 USAKITAKE

DET

DEL MONTE

MINDANAO III

ULITHI YAP

PALU ISLAND

BIAK

Sarmi

NEW GUINEA

NEW BRITAIN

Port Moresby

COALCANA

NEW GUINEA

POWELL

Townsville

XXXXX

SWPA

MACARTHUR

Brisbane

Adelaide

Melbourne

Sydney

TASMANIA

Wellington

Auckland

GHORMLEY

1 MARINE

VANDEGRIFT

XXXXX

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

United States 1939

Population: 130,900,000

Army:

**189,839 (Active Duty – Includes
Air Corps)**

24,724 (Air Corps)

~220,000 (National Guard)

~800 combat aircraft

Navy:

CV: 6*

BB: 16

CA: 17

CL: 17

DD: 102

SS: 78

125,202 personnel

~1,200 aircraft

Marine Corps: 19,432

In 1939, the United States had the 2nd largest navy in the world behind that of Great Britain.

The United States Army Air Corps was the 7th largest at the time and considered the most modern in terms of the overall capabilities of its front line combat aircraft.

The U.S. Army was ranked 17th in size (behind Portugal) and 19th in ability. This ranking did not include the National Guard which was about to be purged of more than a third of its personnel for age, health and fitness issues.

Aside from its trucks, most of the army's equipment was either WWI in design or in fact WWI surplus.

JAPAN 1941

Population (Home Islands)

73,114,308

Empire (not including 1930's
expansions)

103,727,610

Army:

1,700,000

51 Divisions

40 Divisions in China

~1,500 combat aircraft

Navy:

CV: 11

BB: 10

CA: 18

CL: 20

DD: 122

SS: 61

1,830 aircraft (~600 carrier
based)

UNITED STATES 1941

Population: 133,400,000

Army:

1,644,000 (includes Air Corps)

34 Divisions (organized)

17 deemed fit for defensive
operations.

152,125 (Air Corps)

867,000 (ground forces)

4,477 combat aircraft

Navy:

CV: 8

BB: 17

CA: 18

CL: 19

DD: 171

SS: 112

284,427 personnel

~3,400 aircraft

Pacific

3

9

13

11

79

56

Marine Corps: 54,359 (2 divisions)

CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR

Immediate Causes:

Japan's invasion of China in 1937.

U.S. embargo of oil in July 1941.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

But:

Japan and the United States had been seriously planning for war since at least 1910. Each considered war as more likely than not although neither could specifically envision the immediate causes until they happened.

WWI and the Versailles Treaty certainly "informed" the parties decision making but the relevance to what ultimately happened was at best minimal and mostly irrelevant.

CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR

JAPAN:

Issues with the U.S. date back to the mid-nineteenth century. Can best be described as what Japan saw as a lack of respect and their desire for regional hegemony.

United States:

Began with the annexation of the Philippines as until then the U.S. had no real interest in the region. (But this annexation also gave Japan pause as the anti-imperialist U.S. was not so anti-imperialist after all.)

Japan's war with Russia meant Japan was expansionist (they already were) and, more importantly, might threaten the Philippines.

CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR

In the end, rather than look for a specific cause (beyond the immediate cause), the entire situation in the Western Pacific can best be described as death by a thousand paper cuts.

PRINCIPALS OF WAR

OBJECTIVE	A clear and attainable objective to be gained through employment of combat power.
SIMPLICITY	Plans should be simple, not based on achieving perfection.
ECONOMY OF FORCE	Or the concept of how not to put 100 lbs of stuff in a 10 lb bag.
MASS	Concentration of combat power on a critical point.
UNITY OF COMMAND	There should be one chain of command focused on one objective. Multiplicity leads to disaster.
CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT	Multiple thrust work best if they are coordinated and intended to achieve a singular objective.
LOGISTICS	An army that is well supplied can fight. An army that is not supplied has already been defeated.



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JAPAN

-  International boundary
-  National capital
-  Prefecture capital
-  City, Town
-  Highway
-  Road
-  Airport

JAPAN

Prior to 1603 – Japan was a culture, not a nation. It was several islands divided between numerous Daimyo (noble families) who were constantly at war with one another.

Almost unified in 13th Century due to threat from Mongol invasions (1274 and 1281). Both invasions were thwarted by typhoons. First known use of hand grenades.

Japan was in a state of constant civil war from around 1000 C.E. The Mongol Invasions did not even stop those wars (they did not affect the situation in the north of the islands.)

1543 First Europeans reach Japan (two shipwrecked Portuguese explorers.) Japanese were seen as to “excel not only all other Oriental peoples, they surpass Europeans as well.” Japanese were considered militarily at least equal to the then military power of Spain in terms of ability (if not numbers).

JAPAN

1543 – 1614 Nanban Period. Trade booms between Japan and Europe (Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands). The arquebus (matchlock musket) was the first European trade good. (Japan had cannon since around the time of the Mongol invasions.)

Various of the warring Daimyo began to have their own made by local craftsmen. By 1590, Japanese firearms were of better quality, more widespread and better employed tactically than in any European army. European traders witnessed field artillery in battle in Japan decades before such weapons were employed in Europe.

1549 Jesuit Missionaries arrive (St. Francis Xavier). Japan soon becomes the most Christian Asian culture (it was still but a small minority of the Japanese and concentrated largely in Kyushu and southern Honshu.) Shinto remained the dominant religion although many also followed Buddhism.

JAPAN

1571

Nagasaki, a small fishing village, become the primary trade port and the center of Japanese Christianity. (In 1945, the Cathedral was one of the few buildings to survive the atomic bomb attack.)

At this time there is no central government. Japan is divided into scores of feuding fiefdoms. Within those fiefdoms, the authority of the head of the dominant clan (Daimyo) is absolute. Trade with the west is through various trade monopolies held by those Daimyo who allow it. The most open trade is through the Prefecture that included the port at Nagasaki.

THE EMPEROR

There was an Emperor of Japan. He had no political, military or economic authority. He was the High Priest of the Shinto religion centered at Kyoto. The current Emperor (Naruhito) is descended from the first from before the rise of the Roman Empire, the oldest dynasty in the world. Arguably, not having power or much wealth for most of its history probably explains why it lasted as long as it has.

To this day, the coronation robes for the Emperor are the robes of a Shinto priest.

Prior to 1872, the Emperor was not viewed as being 'divine'. In fact, most Japanese were unaware there was one.



JAPAN

IN THE
AZUCHI-MOMOYAMA PERIOD

安土桃山時代の日本

- Land of the Oda clan, 1560
- Area conquered by Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi by 1582
- Main Daimyō opposed to Hideyoshi in 1582
- Other areas
- Castle town
- Town
- × Battle
- Ukita Daimyō house



JAPAN

Oda Nobunaga

1534 – 1582

Second son of a deputy governor (lesser nobility) who had a reputation for disregarding social convention as a youth and an early expert in the use of firearms, in 1551 he became heir to his clan but his claim was challenged by more proper families. By 1559, he had eliminated all opposition within his clan and province, but had many enemies.

In 1560, a large army was mustered to crush his province. Outnumbered more than 10:1, Nobunaga's forces crushed the attackers and seized their lands. This led to more attacks, more victories and more lands such that by 1582 he controlled over half of Japan. In this year a long time ally of his Akechi Mitsuhide rebelled.

It is unclear whether Nobunaga was assassinated or committed suicide, but Mitsuhide claimed dominion over all his territory.

Nobunaga had no sons.

JAPAN

Oda Nobunaga

1534 – 1582

- **Revolutionized warfare in Japan.**
- **First to deploy field artillery to support infantry and break up enemy formations. Europeans would adopt the tactic based on reports from traders in Japan.**
- **Deployed massed infantry armed with muskets as opposed to pikes who fired volleys with one rank firing while others loaded. This was about 100 years before it became standard in Europe.**
- **Developed weather proof muskets decades before any appeared in Europe.**
- **Developed siege warfare techniques and field engineering that would not have a European equivalent until Vauban (1633 – 1707).**



JAPAN

Toyotomi Hideyoshi 1536 – 1598

Born a peasant and indentured as a servant to a Samurai in the service of Nobunaga, he rose through the ranks of Nobunaga's force to become second in command by 1580. When Nobunaga was deposed, he killed the rebel leader Mitsuhide and crushed Mitsuhide's forces and supporters. He had himself proclaimed the Emperor's Protector – giving him authority over the rest of the Daimyo.

He sought to end centuries of civil wars. He believed the causes included:

Class mobility which allowed the ambitious to seek wealth and power.

An armed peasantry.

A warrior class dependent upon war for their livelihood, and to a lesser extent,

Foreign influences and intrigues.

JAPAN

Toyotomi Hideyoshi 1536 – 1598

He established a fixed class structure. Samurai at the top, then priests, peasants, artisans and at the bottom were merchants. (Merchants had to sully themselves by dealing with foreigners.)

All major landowners had to maintain a lavish house at his capital (Nagoya), under the supervision of him and his men. If they left for any reason, their family – most importantly their children – had to remain behind.

Only the Samurai could be armed. But to keep them from causing trouble he sent them to conquer Korea (they failed.)

He sought to restrict all foreigners and ban Christianity as a dangerous, foreign influence.

He named five powerful Daimyo as regent for his son Hideyori in the event of his death.

JAPAN

Ieyasu Tokugawa 1543 – 1616

A powerful Daimyo who was at times allied with and at other in opposition with both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi throughout the period, he was named as one of the five Regents for Hideyoshi's son.

When another and more popular regent died, he took over sending the nine year old boy into exile in a remote province.

He completed the unification of Japan and became the first Shogun, ruling in the name of the Emperor in 1603.

He was not anti- Western or anti-Christian as his predecessor had been and had no overseas adventures in mind. However, in 1614 following a fraud and corruption scandal involving Spanish missionaries, he banned the religion and all Westerners from Japan aside from a small Dutch trading post as they had agreed to bar all missionaries from the post.

Japan would remain isolated from the West for the next 240 years.

JAPAN

EDO PERIOD 1603 – 1868 (Tokugawa Shogunate)

In 1603, Ieyasu moved the political center to Edo (now Tokyo), a town he had been given as payment for not opposing the efforts of Hideyoshi.

During this period, Japan's economy flourished (relative to before). It remained isolationist although not ignorant of events on the Asian continent. This is the golden era of traditional Japanese art, literature, theater and culture most of which arose to keep the Samurai class too busy being artistic and cultured to cause trouble.

In 1603, Japan was more populous than any European country and had a slightly higher standard of living. Technologically, it was on par with Europe. Militarily, its armies were larger and superior to any in Europe. Only at sea could Europe claim an edge, but not in that part of the world.

By 1850, Japan had missed out on the Enlightenment, the dawn of science, and the Industrial Revolution. China, the culture it had admired and copied for a thousand years was being carved up by the European powers...



**Commodore Matthew Perry, U.S.N.
Commander, U.S. Asiatic Squadron
1852 - 1855**

THE OPENING OF JAPAN

1853 – Commodore Perry under orders from President Fillmore sailed to Asia to obtain trade concessions for American traders. Particular interest in opening trade with Japan.

(U.S. had taken over Dutch concession at their request during the Napoleonic Wars).

U.S. had whaling fleets operating off Japan that wanted access for provisioning.

U.S. Navy wanted coaling station under their control in the Far East.

U.S. wanted dominant if not exclusive trading rights with a country in East Asia.

Perry sent to Japan with letter demanding such an agreement.

JAPAN

1853: U.S. Squadron arrived and demanded trade negotiations. The Japanese stalled ... once they learn U.S. wanted to talk to someone in charge. (They slowly sent one slightly higher ranking official after another despite threats – which the U.S. Squadron actually was not in a position to really carry out.)

Japan: Emperor was absolutely opposed to opening Japan, but he had no power or influence.

Shogun: Was sick and would die within weeks. His bureaucrats were split. The local military governor reported he could not hope to stop the Americans if they use force.

Merchants: Still the lowest class but also wealthy. They wanted to expand trade to viable markets – and their Asian neighbors were not viable.

The economy was in the doldrums.

Japan accepted the letter from the President but declined to respond.

JAPAN

1854: Perry returned.

In the interim, the Shogun died and his successor was sick. Perry left trade goods and examples of technology.

The regent petitioned the Daimyo on what to do, something that has never been done before. Their response was effectively exactly 1/3 to agree to the trade treaty, 1/3 reject the request and 1/3 undecided.

Japan was not cut off from the world around them and was well aware what western trade had done to China. They were reluctant to become the next victim. But they could not fight and expect to win.

The regent agreed on all points.

The U.S. essentially agreed to guarantee Japanese sovereignty – i.e. prevent foreign efforts at subjugation. (Unfortunately the U.S. was not really in a position to guarantee anything and would soon become distracted.)

JAPAN

1854 – 1868:

The U.S. was not the beneficiary of their diplomacy as they become mired with their own internal problems (the Civil War.)

Treaties were signed with European powers and they began trade on extremely favorable terms. These “Unequal Treaties” prevented imposition of tariffs, allowed the Europeans to set prices, and prevented any European to be subject to Japanese law. The Japanese economy effectively collapsed as currency speculation deflated the Yen. The various European powers dealt with the local Daimyo and not the Shogun in Tokyo and attempted to set up concessions and spheres of influence as they had in China.

Dissatisfied Daimyo in Kyushu and southern Honshu began to try to convince the Komei Emperor Osahito to reject the diplomacy of the Shogunate. He became more vocal at court, but remained ignored. A rebellion against the Shogun to place the Emperor in power broke out in 1867, but the Emperor died before the issue was resolved.

JAPAN

1868 – 1869: The Boshin War

The southern rebels were armed with modern weapons, to include ironclad warships. These were purchased from western arms dealers and not specific nations.

They destroyed an attempt by the Shogun to suppress them in 1866. In 1868 they rose up with the backing of the new Meiji Emperor who agreed to assume political power over the country.

The Shogun abdicated in favor of the Emperor, then led an army to capture the Emperor and put down the rebellion. But that army was not nearly as well armed or prepared as the rebels who easily defeat the old Samurai.

At the outset, the rebels wanted to expel all foreigners and close Japan to the West. By the end, however, the new government decided to modernize – to equal the West such that no European power could dominate its affairs.



Meiji Emperor

Mutsuhito

1852 - 1912

Reign: 1867 - 1912

Advised by a Privy Council made up of hereditary Daimyo from clans that had “restored” imperial authority.

He favored modernization but not at the expense of Japanese independence and autonomy. Japan would equal the West, not become subject to the West.

But ... prior to 1868 the Emperor had no political power. He was merely the High Priest of the Shinto faith. In 1872, most Japanese did not even know they had an emperor. The new government decided he needed to be divine...

JAPAN – MEIJI RESTORATION

1867 - 1895

Japan would adopt methods, systems, ideas from the West for their own purposes deliberately selecting the ideas of one nation over another looking for what was best, or at least what was best for them.

Foreigners were not allowed to own any Japanese land or companies.

They were not allowed to command Japanese troops.

They could teach, but subject to Japanese supervision and only until such time as it took for Japanese teachers to reach or exceed their level.

This was unlike anywhere else in Asia where the dominant forces in the economy and militaries were European.

The Americans who came (mostly as teachers) felt the Japanese had the right idea. The Europeans saw them as short-sighted and destined for failure. (In this age, Americans were mostly anti-imperialists while the Europeans were rabidly imperialist.)

JAPAN – MEIJI RESTORATION

1867 - 1895

Japanese thinking was:

- The best way to avoid what had happened to other Asian nations since contact with the West (especially China) was to gain the respect of the West by becoming a modern, self-made, industrialized state.**
- That Japan should accomplish this goal without direct Western assistance as such “aide” usually led to economic if not political colonization.**
- That Japan would decide which Western practices would be best for Japan.**

They sent abroad their best and brightest to observe and learn. But the decisions about what would be adopted, what would be adapted and what would be avoided would be made in Japan after consideration of many options.

JAPAN – MEIJI RESTORATION


1867 - 1895

In business, Banking, finance and industrial methods, Japan adopted practices from the United States, Great Britain and to a lesser extent the newly formed German Empire.

In military affairs, their Navy was based on the Royal Navy (as were all the modern major navies not based in France). Their Army was based upon the Prussian Army that had recently defeated France (Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871). They bought ships from France and Britain and military hardware from Germany and the United States.

In government, they decided some form of Constitutional Monarchy was “modern” and “respected” in the West and best suited for adoption in principal. An American or French democracy was contrary to both their tradition and goal of having the Emperor as their Head of State.

But the British system was considered too liberal and chaotic. They chose the system based upon that had been recently adopted by the newly (1871) unified Germany.




Meiji Constitution of 1889

Above: Principal advisors and Executive Branch. None above were elected.

The Diet (Legislature) could pass laws, raise taxes and approve a budget but only where doing so did not interfere with or unduly restrict the policies of the Emperor or his Imperial Council (top line).

The lower house was elected. The upper house was Peers of the Empire.



Meiji Constitution of 1889

The Prime Minister was recommended to the Emperor usually by the Keeper of the Pivy Seal – a hereditary Daimyo appointed by the Emperor who served at the Emperor’s pleasure. The Prime Minister named his cabinet Ministers except for War and Navy who were appointed by the Army and Navy.

The Prime Minister served for no fixed term. If he or any member of his cabinet stepped down, died or was removed from office, the government collapsed and a new Prime Minister (and cabinet) would be appointed.

JAPAN – MEIJI CONSTITUTION 1889

The Military

The Navy and War Minister dealt mainly with funding and procurement.

They were serving officers (Generals and Admirals) appointed by their service. (And could be removed by their service thus ending the term of the Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet.)

They had no authority over training, planning, strategy or operations.

Neither did the Prime Minister. The Army and Navy answered directly to the Emperor through their Chiefs of the General Staffs.

All members of the armed forces were bound by the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882. They owed their loyalty to the Emperor only. They did not answer to the civilian government and were expected to remain apolitical.

However, until 1931 the military deferred to the Prime Minister on issues of foreign affairs.

JAPAN – MEIJI CONSTITUTION 1889

Despite the apparent structure, in practice the Emperor was neither a dictator nor an autocratic ruler.

While Emperor Meiji was keenly interested in the activities of his government and often attended Cabinet Meetings (the only one who did prior to 1945), he seldom spoke and deferred to his government on all matters.

Hirohito was the first modern Emperor to offer anything like a criticism of his government's policy (in September 1941 when he questioned the need to go to war with the United States) and the first to demand action from his government and military (to end a coup in 1936 and to accept the terms of surrender in August of 1945).

The government was structured to encourage consensus between the otherwise equal members of the cabinet and armed forces and in a manner it was believed would prevent any one individual or department from gaining control, real or apparent, over the others. In practice, this worked ... until 1931.

JAPAN IMPERIAL EXPANSION

Unfortunately, one of the lessons Japan observed from the West in the late 19th Century was that to be respected as a nation, the nation had to either be expansionist or seek and obtain an overseas empire.



JAPAN IMPERIAL EXPANISION 1868 - 1884

BONIN ISLANDS: Buninjima or “Uninhabited Islands” in Japanese.

Discovered (and reported) by Japanese fishermen ~ 1670. Claimed by Japan following an expedition in 1675 and then mostly forgotten.

1827: British naval cartographic vessel claimed the islands for Britain, but again the claim was promptly forgotten.

1830: An expedition from Hawaii (then an independent Kingdom) claimed the islands and established a small colony.

1853: On Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan, he claimed the Islands as a U.S. Colony and names the leader of the small community Governor.

1862: The islands are again claimed by Japan. Japanese settlers arrive in 1876 and the 60 or so colonist from Hawaii and the U.S. are granted Japanese citizenship.

IWO JIMA (Volcano Islands) unclaimed and uninhabited until 1889 when Japanese fishermen set up operations. Annexed in 1891.

JAPAN IMPERIAL EXPANSION 1868 - 1884



Kuril Islands

Disputed between Japan and Russia as early as 1855 along with Sakhalin Island.

Dispute resolved by treaty in 1875. Russia gained undisputed claim to Sakhalin Island, Japan gained similar undisputed claim to Kuril Islands and annexed them.

JAPAN IMPERIAL EXPANISION 1868 - 1884

Ryukyu Islands

Northern islands were Japanese and had been for over a thousand years under Daimyo from Kyushu. The southern islands ethnically and linguistically were not, but are distantly related.

Languages are as Spanish is to Italian. That being said, Japonic (including Japanese) and

Korean are “isolates” and not part of any larger linguistic family. By trade, however, the southern Kyushu islands were more closely affiliated with China for centuries. In the 15th Century, Japanese overlords began encroaching into the southern islands. Since the 16th century, the islanders paid tribute to both their Japanese overlords and to China.



JAPAN IMPERIAL EXPANISION 1868 - 1884

RYUKYU ISLANDS:

Economically and socially tied to China, politically dominated by Japanese. The relationship between the islanders and Japanese was (and remains) neither close nor pleasant and often violent. However, the islands remained notionally independent provided they paid tribute to both China and the Japanese.

In 1872 they decided to stop paying the Chinese tribute. This was encouraged by Japan but was also motivated by the belief that China could not do anything.

In 1879, Japan annexed the islands.

These initial annexations garnered little international attention. The various islands were either already seen as Japanese (Ryukyus) or sparsely inhabited (if at all). In most cases they were of value only for fishing.



JAPAN AND KOREA
 Compiled and Drawn in the Cartographic Section of
 the National Geographic Society for
THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE
 Gilbert Grosvenor, Editor
 Author of the 1908-1910 Expedition
 Number Periodic 1948 and later
 SCALE 1:400,000 OR 4750 METERS TO THE INCH

Principal Nations ———— (1948) ———— Provinces ————


National Capitals • Provincial Capitals • District Capitals •
 Boundaries and Districts as of
 WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 1948

Nation	Capital	Province	Capital	District	Capital
China	Peking	Shan	Shan	Shan	Shan
Japan	Tokyo	Hokkaido	Sapporo	Hokkaido	Sapporo
Korea	Seoul	Chungcheong	Daejeon	Chungcheong	Daejeon
Manchuria	Changchun	Manchuria	Manchuria	Manchuria	Manchuria
Philippines	Manila	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
Formosa	Taipei	Formosa	Formosa	Formosa	Formosa
Ryukyu Islands	Naha	Ryukyu Islands	Ryukyu Islands	Ryukyu Islands	Ryukyu Islands
Sakhalin	Vladivostok	Sakhalin	Sakhalin	Sakhalin	Sakhalin

James M. Dunbar, chief cartographer
 Cartography by James M. Dunbar, Richard A. Miller and Sara C. Brown
 Made in the U.S.A.

LOCATION OF JAPAN
 IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895



FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

For centuries, Korea had been a vassal kingdom of China. It had its own Emperor and government but paid tribute to the Chinese Empire and its foreign policy was subject to Chinese oversight and approval.

For Japan, it had been a principal trade partner during the Tokugawa era.

With the Meiji Restoration Korea became a strategic interest. The Koreans were not a threat to Japan but economically they were a net exporter of food (Japan a net importer) and a source of coal and iron that Japan needed for its industrial expansion.

But it was politically weak and had become of interest to European dominated China and Russia, both of which were viewed as potentially hostile by the Japanese.

Control of the Korean Peninsula by a hostile power posed a real and present threat. As one diplomat observed in the early 1970's – "Korea is the dagger aimed at the heart of Japan." (The phrase would be used about 80 years later by Douglas MacArthur.)

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

1875: Japan signed treaties with the United States and Great Britain wherein both guarantee Japanese independence and would oppose any attempts by other European powers to intervene or interfere in Japan. The treaty with Britain included a military alliance to that effect.

1876: Korea had thus far resisted all attempts by Europeans to open its ports to trade. Korea became known as the Hermit Kingdom following the opening of Japan two decades earlier.

Korea was an independent country in name only. It had an emperor, a government and an army, but all were effectively controlled by China and had been for 200 years. But China was not what it once was.

Japan managed to force a trade treaty with Korea opening its ports to trade and allowing Japanese business into the country. Similar treaties with the west followed.

(One with the U.S. was a trade agreement in which the U.S. agreed to guarantee Korean sovereignty.)

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

Politically, Korea soon fractured.

The king, government and army were conservative seeking to preserve old customs, prevent modernization or foreign influences. China backed this faction.

Reformers were those who wished to emulate Japan and become a modern nation state. This group was encouraged by foreign (mostly U.S.) missionaries and was backed by Japan.

1882: a drought and crop failure led to food shortages and economic collapse. The Korean Army mutinied against the Emperor. Riots broke out. The palace was attacked as was the Japanese legation which was forced to flee. Japanese business were also attacked.

Japan intervened with troops to safeguard Japanese interests and demand reparation. China intervened to counter the Japanese. Tensions remained high until a treaty was signed between the two countries. (Korea was not a party).

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

China agreed to turn over all Korean “rebels” to the Japanese or ensure they were punished (executed) and make Korea pay for loss of property and life. Japan was allowed a permanent (small) garrison in Seoul to safeguard its legation and interests. The expeditionary troops were then withdrawn.

1884: a pro-Japanese coup overthrew the pro-Chinese Korean government. More riots and the Japanese legation was burned and many guards and officials killed. China and Japan again intervened.

1885: Convention of Tientsin: both sides agreed to withdraw from Korea. Neither side would supply or train the Koreans (China had been the only one doing so.) Both sides agreed not to intervene in Korea without prior notice to the other.

China, however, continued to attempt to control Korean affairs and hinder continued Korean trade with Japan much to the annoyance of Japan.

Japan continued to encourage anti-Chinese reformers.

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

Tensions continued to mount, but it was hostility by proxy. China and Japan acted against Koreans supporting the other side or encouraged their Koreans to do so.

1894: The Dongbak Rebellion. A peasant revolt against the Korean government. Its goals included ending both Chinese and Japanese influence. It quickly began to overwhelm the Korean Army sent to quell it.

The Korean government called on China to intervene which it did sending ~35,000 troops. Japan sent troops in response but claimed it was solely to protect Japanese interests.

European observers were convinced that the European equipped, trained and advised Chinese would make short work of the self-made Japanese forces should war break out.

When the Korean government (still fighting the rebellion) ordered Japan to withdraw its troops, those troops overthrew the government and installed pro-Japanese reformers (July 23, 1894).

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE WAR: 1894 - 1895

China announced it was withdrawing its troops as the crisis had passed. (It had not. The Donghak Rebellion would continue until wiped out by a Japanese battalion armed with new Maxim machine guns and modern artillery in 1895.) But it made no move to withdraw some 4,000 troops outside of Seoul and sent reinforcements by sea.

On July 25th, 1894 a Japanese naval squadron under Capt. Heihachiro Togo fired on the convoy, crippling one escort and driving the others away. The British flagged troop ship stopped, the Chinese troops mutinied and the ship was sunk.

On July 28th, 1894, the Japanese troops attacked the remaining Chinese and routed them forcing them to flee north. Japan declared war August 1st while pursuing the retreating Chinese.

A Chinese force from Manchuria along with survivors from the defeat south of Seoul was defeated at Pyongyang by two Japanese columns, one from Seoul and the other which had landed at Wonsan across the peninsula to the east.



The day after Pyonggyang fell to the Japanese (September 15th, 1894), the Japanese Navy destroyed the Chinese Navy at the Battle of the Yalu. The Chinese had just landed more troops to support its Korean expedition. What was left from Pyonggyang and the new troops were routed at Dandong on the Yalu and Japan pursued into Manchuria.

The European experts were right. The war was a rout. But it was the Japanese that crushed the Chinese.

TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI 1895

Signed April 17, 1895 after China sued for peace having lost every engagement and with the Japanese in total control of Korea, the Liaodung Peninsula, and with troops on the Shantung Peninsula and Formosa.

- Korea would be independent in fact with no further relationship with China.**
- Japan would gain control “in perpetuity” over the Liaodung Peninsula and Formosa.**
- Japan would gain most favored nation treatment in China.**
- Japan would gain access to ports on the Yangtze River for trade and access for Japanese business.**
- China would pay Japan reparations equal to about what the war had cost Japan. (~\$5 billion in current value).**

TRIPLE INTERVENTION 1895

Six days after Japan and China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, France, Germany and Russia protested demanding that the treaty be vacated or modified to their satisfaction and implying that they would take unspecified action if their demands were not met.

France and Germany considered the trade provisions as threatening their own trade interests in China. The two countries had also lost a small fortune arming and supplying the Chinese who had been crushed in the war.

Russia consider Japanese possession of the Liaodung Peninsula both a threat to their territorial interests and to their planned Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In November 1895, Japan signed a convention with the three powers. They did not give up their trade concessions with China, but lost the monopoly on ports. Japan agreed to give up the Liaodung Peninsula to control by the three powers. Japan was not asked to make any concessions regarding Formosa or Korea.

TRIPLE INTERVENTION 1895

Japan – and other western observers – assumed that the three powers (France, Germany and Russia) would occupy and administer the Liaodung Peninsula.

They were mistaken.

Russia had concluded a separate agreement with China obtaining a large concession to build railways through and across Manchuria, ultimately from Lake Baikal in Siberia to Vladivostock and to Beijing.

The concession placed much of Manchuria under Russian control.

It was only Russia that would occupy the Liaodung. Russia would further fortify key cities and turn Port Arthur into a major base for its Pacific Fleet.

Japan objected.

The United States and Great Britain who Japan expected would support her position, stayed out of the controversy.

KOREA

The three powers had not demanded any revision of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki regarding Korea. That treaty all but made Korea a protectorate of Japan and in that age, protectorate meant hands off to anyone else.


Russia began interfering in Korea almost from the start.

Specifically, it underbid the Japanese on railway contracts and Russian companies began mining and other operations in the north. Russia believed it had negotiated sole right to build a railroad from Harbin (Manchuria) to Pusan Korea, a project Japanese companies believed rightfully theirs.

Japan entered into a series of diplomatic negotiations with Russia with the goal of getting the Russians to stay out of Korea.

Russia stalled, suspended and otherwise continuously frustrated any efforts to reach any agreement that would limit Russian interests in Korea.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904 - 1905



RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904 - 1905



Tsar Nicholas II of Russia was an undisputed autocrat in 1904. He could and often did override the decisions of his Ministers. Manchuria and Korea were Russia's by divine right and no pathetic country of "yellow skinned monkeys" would dare stand in the way.

He was convinced the Japanese would do as he expected. They would accept his terms because they were, in his opinion, too pathetic to resist the might of the Russian Empire.

Japan had a very different opinion of the entire situation.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904 - 1905



Left: Japanese Troops near Mukden 1905.

Right: Russian 1st Army on the march, 1904.

The collective wisdom of Western military observers was different from the Tsar in that they did not see Japan backing down from a fight.

But they generally agreed with the Tsar that while Japan had been impressive against the Chinese ten years earlier, that was China and not a modern, European Army.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: 1904-1905

Russia conceded nothing to Japan in the negotiations regarding Korea and Manchuria. Russia was drawing out the negotiations to allow time for troops to reach the Far East. On February 6, 1904 after another Japanese proposal was ignored, Japan severed diplomatic relations.

On February 8, Japan declared war on Russia to the shock of the Tsar. Even more shocking was that three hours before the declaration was delivered to his foreign Ministry, the Japanese had attacked the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur with torpedo boats.

Two Russian battleships and a cruiser were damaged.

The Japanese Navy then sought to blockade the port. Block ships (old merchant ships filled with concrete and deliberately sunk) failed to close the port. The Japanese then mined the approaches.

On April 12, 1904, two Russian battleships attempted to slip out and struck mines. One was sunk carrying the fleet commander to his death, the other was crippled and towed back to port.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: 1904-1905



The Russians also laid mines around Port Arthur and two Japanese battleships were sunk a month later.



On May 1st, 1904, the Japanese Army crossed the Yalu River and outflanked and defeated the Russian defenders driving north to cut off Russian reinforcement of Port Arthur. A separate force landed on the coast in June and advanced on the Port against another Russian army.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: 1904-1905


Unlike the prior war, the Russians did not break and run and fought from prepared entrenchments supported with machine guns (a foreshadowing of WWI that would be largely ignored) inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing Japanese.

By August, the Russians were pinned into positions around Port Arthur at the far tip of the Peninsula.

Soon, Japanese artillery was in range of the port and the trapped Pacific Fleet. On August 10, the fleet tried to break out and head for Vladivostock only to be met by the Japanese and driven back after an otherwise indecisive battle.



RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904 - 1905



Blockaded by sea and under siege and artillery fire by land, the bulk of the Russian Pacific Fleet was sunk at Port Arthur following their retreat after the Battle of the Yellow Sea. The Russian garrison would surrender in January 1905. The bulk of the Russian Army would be defeated at the Battle of Mukden in March 1905 and retreated to Russia. Casualties on both sides were astronomical for the time.

Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905

Even before the Russian Pacific Fleet was finally bottled up at Port Arthur following the Battle of the Yellow sea in August, 1904, the Russians had decided to reinforce with ships from their Baltic and Black Seas Fleets. It would be no easy task. Britain was allied with Japan which meant major warships could not use British ports or the Suez Canal.

This would mean that the main fighting force of the fleet would have to travel over 18,000 miles – 8,000 miles further than if they could use the Suez Canal.

Moreover, the two fleets capital ships were either brand new with untrained crews or so old and obsolete as to be all but useless. The Russians had a man who might get the Fleet to Port Arthur:



ADM Zinovy Rozhdestvensky
Capable, but was convinced from the beginning he was on a fool's errand...

Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905

The Japanese fleet was modern, well maintained with seasoned and highly trained crews and knew where the Russians were. They were led by ADM Heihachiro Togo. As a Captain, Togo had fired the first shots of the Sino-Japanese War. As a Vice Admiral, his squadrons had fired the first shots of the Russo-Japanese War. He had also commanded the fleet at the Yellow Sea.



Above: Admiral Togo in 1903.




Left: The Japanese Combined Fleet sortie from Chinhae Korea to engage the Russian Fleet at the Tsushima Straits, May 27th, 1905. It would be the last battle of the war...

Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905



Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905



JAPAN:

4 BB
27 CA/CL
21 DD
37 PT

117 KIA, 583 WIA
3 PT sunk

RUSSIA:


11 BB
6 CA/CL
9 DD
12 AK

4,380 KIA,
5,917 POW
7 BB + 14 others
sunk. 13 ships
captured. 4
escape.

Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905



Battle of Tsushima: May 27th, 1905




TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (Sep 5th, 1905)

The war was immensely popular in Japan. After all, as far as the average Japanese knew their military always won and won easily.

The first part was true. The second was misleading. The land war had been very costly. The naval war had not been cheap either. 1/3 of the Japanese brand new battleships had been sunk by mines. Japan was in debt and could not sustain a prolonged war effort. This was not known to the public.

Japan first approached the U.S. in late 1904 about a possible brokered peace. It made its formal request following the Battle of Mukden in March 1905.



TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (Sep 5th, 1905)

In contrast, the war was hugely unpopular in Russia even before the people learned how poorly their military fared. Coupled with a crippled economy and lack of any political voice, in January 1905 spontaneous protests in St. Petersburg, Moscow and elsewhere became a revolt against the old order.

Russia did not agree to mediation until after it lost its fleet at Tsushima and the Tsar was informed that success was no longer possible.



Above: St. Petersburg Russia. “Bloody Sunday” January 22, 1905.

A protest principally about the war and poor food distribution (in background) is met by Imperial cavalry. Photo is moments before the cavalry attacked. In this and other encounters that day, hundreds of unarmed protesters were killed.


TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (Sep 5th, 1905)

Negotiations almost broke down over reparations. The Tsar absolutely refused and had sent 4 divisions to the east to resume the war. Japan was almost broke.

And because it was almost broke it was in a poor position to resume the war.

Japan gave up its demand for reparations.

Russia would vacate Manchuria and make no further effort to expand in the East. Japan gained half of Sakhalin Island. The Liaodung Peninsula would revert to China.



TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (Sep 5th, 1905)

Japan would also gain all Russian mining concessions in Korea and Manchuria as well as control of the Southern Manchurian Railway (Harbin – Dailan) and Manchuria-Korean Railway (Shenyang-Pyongyang) including right to operate, maintain and defend.

Russia would retain the Trans-Manchurian Railway without a right to defend (Chita-Vladivostok).

Japan would gain this in the Treaty of Versailles in 1918.

In hindsight, perhaps this was a mistake...



TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (Sep 5th, 1905)


The Japanese public felt it had been robbed by the West in general and the United States in particular. In their mind, they had won a major war and gained nothing. There were riots. And then their economy collapsed.

It did not help that:

- Roosevelt had said the Japanese were “honorary white men.”
- The State of California in response to a wave of Japanese emigration decided that Japanese children should attend segregated schools “like other people of color.”

The Japanese military was less concerned about most of the concessions save the lack of reparations. They had rebuilt and modernized following the Sino-Japanese War on Chinese reparations. They could not rearm or replace losses without reparations. They were not mollified when the U.S. supported their annexations of Korea in 1910.

Worse, in 1906 the whole picture changed and Japan had no immediate ability to adapt...



By 1904, the more modern navies recognized that their warships were inefficiently designed with guns of multiple calibers for no reason. The ideal battleship would have a large main battery for fleet actions. Any lesser guns would be for close defense against torpedo attack. This was theoretical until December 1906 when the British commissioned HMS Dreadnought rendering every battleship in the world then in service obsolete. By then Japan had a similar ship under construction but lacked the money to complete it anytime soon, much less build more.